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Two sometimes conflicting principles, anti-differentiation and anti-subordination, un-
derlie equal protection jurisprudence Anti-differentiation contends that it is inappro-
priate to treat individuals differently because of their race or sex Thus, anti-
differentiation advocates often reject affirmative action programs. Anti-subordination,
by contrast, argues that it is inappropriate for groups to be subordinated in society. The
latter perspective rejects policies, even iffacially neutral, that perpetuate the historical
subordination of groups, while embracing even facially differentiating policies that
ameliorate subordination. Professor Colker argues that although many scholars have
long viewed anti-differentiation as the justifiably dominant perspective, anti-subordina-
tion better explains much of the equal protection doctrine's history and case law, as
well as the aversion we feel toward race and sex discrimination. She applauds judicial
acceptance of the anti-subordination perspective in affirmative action cases, and sug-
gests a framework for incorporation of the anti-subordination principle into all equal
protection analysis
INTRODUCTION
Feminists often criticize equal protection' doctrine for not taking
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J.D., 1981, Harvard University. I wish to thank Mary Whisner, John Stick, Vicki Schultz,
Michael Perry, Catherine Hancock, Joel Friedman, and Paul Barron for their assistance. I
also wish to thank the University of Wisconsin Legal Institute for permitting me to share an
earlier version of this Article with the participants at the 1986 Feminist Legal Theory
Conference.
I The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part, "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This Article uses the phrase "equal protection" to refer
to statutory as well as constitutional claims of race or sex discrimination. Although most of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to h-6, was enacted pursuant to Congress's
commerce clause power rather than pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, see S. Rep.
No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2355,
2366-68, both the legislative history and judicial interpretion of that statute make clear that it
was meant to further the same concerns and values that are embodied in the equal protection
clause. See id. at 16, 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2362-65; Bureau of Nat'l Aff.,
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
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discrimination against women seriously enough.2 They consider the
courts' use of intermediate rather than strict scrutiny3 in assessing sex-
based equal protection claims a symptom of this problem.4 Civil rights
advocates also criticize the race cases for not taking seriously enough the
vision of equality for blacks. Although they generally applaud the use of
strict scrutiny in race discrimination cases, they disagree with the courts'
handling of some affirmative action cases.5
In this Article, I enter this discussion by starting from the premise
that equal protection doctrine needs to do a better job understanding
blacks' and womens' visions of equality and needs to have a framework
that more effectively deals with the affirmative action cases. Neverthe-
less, I neither applaud strict scrutiny nor condemn intermediate scrutiny.
I posit a new model that can gain from the benefits of both the race and
sex models of equal protection. Using a comparative race-sex perspective
to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each model of equal protec-
tion, I find that intermediate scrutiny has a beneficial flexibility that is
often lacking from strict scrutiny and that strict scrutiny has a serious-
ness that is often lacking from intermediate scrutiny. In contrast, I find
that the flexibility of intermediate scrutiny sometimes causes courts to
overlook serious claims of discrimination and that the inflexibility of
241, 291-94 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ... as the Court recognizes, and as I would underscore, is the vindication of human
dignity and not mere economies .... [I]n my view, Congress clearly had authority under both
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of
1964.").
2 See, e.g., Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a Man's
World, 2 Law & Inequality 33 (1984); Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the
Supreme Court, 92 Yale L.J. 913 (1983); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 955 (1984); Scales, Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. L.J. 375 (1980-81);
Tokarz, Separate But Unequal Educational Sports Programs: The Need for a New Theory of
Equality, 1 Berkeley Women's LJ. 201 (1985); Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and
the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325 (1984-
85) [hereinafter Williams,Equality's Riddle]; Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections
of Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 175 (1982) [hereinafter Williams,
The Equality Crisis].
3 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); see also text accompanying
notes 172-82 infra.
4 See Law, supra note 2, at 987-1002; Note, Gender-Based Discrimination and the
Supreme Court: A Time for Strict Scrutiny, 47 Alb. L. Rev. 908 (1983). Some commentators,
by contrast, have questioned whether there is even a need for any heightened scrutiny at all in
sex-discrimination cases. See, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 164-70 (1980).
5 See, e.g., W. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-
1812 (1968); Bell, The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1985); Bell, Bakke, Minor-
ity Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 3 (1979) [hereinafter
Bell, Bakke]; Jordan, The Black Underclass Untouched By Brown, 23 How. L.J. 61 (1980);
Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1977); Reid, Assault on Affirmative Action: The Delusion of
Color-Blind America, 23 How. L.J. 381 (1980).
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strict scrutiny often leaves them ill-equipped to respond appropriately to
arguments for affirmative action.
In order to facilitate an exploration of the strengths and weaknesses
of the race and sex discrimination models, I analyze two principles that
underlie these models: the principles of "anti-subordination" and "anti-
differentiation." Under the anti-differentiation perspective, it is inappro-
priate to treat individuals differently on the basis of a particular norma-
tive view about race or sex.6 It is an individual rights perspective in two
respects. First, it focuses on the motivation of the individual institution
that has allegedly discriminated, without attention to the larger societal
context in which the institution operates. Second, the anti-differentiation
perspective focuses on the specific effect of the alleged discrimination on
discrete individuals, rather than on groups.7 Race- and sex-specific poli-
cies8 or actions are invalid under this perspective because they reflect
invidious motivation and result in dissimilar treatment for similarly situ-
6 The "anti-differentiation" approach is similar to what Professor MacKinnon terms the
"differences approach," which "envisions the sexes as socially as well as biologically different
from one another, but calls impermissible or 'arbitrary' those distinctions or classifications that
are found preconceived and/or inaccurate." C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination 4 (1979). The anti-differentiation approach described
in this Article differs somewhat, in that its proponents do not always agree that biological
differences should permit sex-based distinctions. See note 13 infra.
7 However, some anti-differentiation proponents have also recognized the importance of a
group-based analysis in understanding the invidiousness of sex- or race-specific rules. Profes-
sor Williams, representative of this group, has summarized this analysis.
The first proposition essential to this analysis is that sex-based generalizations are
generally impermissible whether derived from physical differences such as size and
strength, from cultural role assignments such as breadwinner or homemaker, or from
some combination of innate and ascribed characteristics, such as the greater longevity of
the average woman compared to the average man. Instead of classifying on the basis of
sex, lawmakers and employers must classify on the basis of the trait or function or be-
havior for which sex was used as a proxy. Strength, not maleness, would be the criterion
for certain jobs; economic dependency, not femaleness, the criterion for alimony upon
divorce. The basis for this proposition is a belief that a dual system of rights inevitably
produces gender hierarchy and, more fundamentally, treats women and men as statisti-
cal abstractions rather than as persons with individual capacities, inclinations and aspi-
rations-at enormous cost to women and not insubstantial cost to men.
Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 2, at 329-30 (footnote omitted). Nonetheless, although
anti-differentiation proponents like Williams may recognize the importance of a group-based
perspective, this recognition seems to spring from pragmatic considerations rather than from
theoretical consistency. See text accompanying note 59 infra (discussing Williams's advocacy
of allowing proof of disparate impact in constitutional as well as statutory equal protection
challenges).
8 The courts' treatment of race- and sex-specific policies is the most fully developed area
of equal protection law and therefore lends itself to the fullest analysis. I believe that other
classifications-on the basis of sexual orientation, age, alienage, handicap, and the like-are
often equally invidious. The thesis of this Article-that an anti-subordination perspective
should dominate the equal protection analysis--can be applied to the treatment of any histori-
cally subjugated group.
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ated individuals. 9 It is equally invidious for white men to be treated dif-
ferently from black women as for black women to be treated differently
from white men under this perspective, because both situations violate
the preeminent norm of equal treatment. Anti-differentiation advocates
therefore argue for "color-blindness" or "sex-blindness" in the develop-
ment and analysis of legislative and institutional policies, 10 and fre-
quently criticize affirmative action as violating that principle."
9 In the race context, proponents of the anti-differentiation perspective have attacked, for
example, minority set-aside programs. They argue that these programs do not promote "racial
rectification" but instead cause "racism, racial spoils systems, racial competition, and racial
odium." Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46
U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 778 (1978). In the sex discrimination context, some proponents of this
perspective support passage of the Equal Rights Amendment because they believe that it
would invalidate sex-based distinctions. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871,
889-93 (1971); see also note 10 infra.
10 The articulation of this anti-differentiation perspective came to the forefront in the de-
bate over the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. The proposed Equal Rights Amend-
ment stated:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
Proposed Amendment XXVII to the United States Constitution, S.J. Res. 8, S.J. Res. 9, and
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
This proposed amendment is the perfect articulation of a neutral, sex-blind perspective; it
deems sex-based distinctions invidious irrespective of whether they accrue to the disadvantage
of men or women. See Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on Equal Rights for Men and
Women, S. Rep. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972). By contrast, Professor MacKinnon
has suggested an Equal Rights Amendment that would embody the anti-subordination per-
spective. See note 122 infra.
11 In the context of racial discrimination, Professor Van Alstyne has argued that the
Court's efforts in invalidating race-specific laws during the 25 years after Brown v. Board of
Education are laudable because "race-based laws have so generally tended to yield by-products
and side effects so vastly.. divisive and wretched." Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 778. The
rationale for beating back laws and policies that have discriminated against blacks does not, in
his view, support the enactment of a new set of race-specific laws and policies designed to
redress that prior history of discrimination. Specifically, he argues that the Court should in-
validate minority set-aside programs for government contracting.
On the confident assurance that there are still important uses for race-based laws in
the more perfect ordering of this society, the Court is invited into yet another rite of
passage. The suggestion, which is not new but which was always a feature of even the
oldest race-based laws, is that it is not the regulating or allocating by race that is wrong
or too risky per se; it is, rather, who is thus regulated, what is thus allocated, what
motivates the arrangement, and what time frame should be followed.
My own view of the matter is that the Court is being asked to permit not racial
rectification [in reviving the licitness of race as an explicit device of government] but
racial repetition [in reviving the invidious consequences of racial classification]. I think
it likely, moreover, that if the Court yields once again to the Lorelei, racism, racial spoils
systems, racial competition, and racial odium will be fixtures of government in the
United States even into the twenty-first century.
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In this Article, I argue that courts should analyze equal protection
cases from an anti-subordination 12 perspective. Under the anti-subordi-
nation perspective, it is inappropriate for certain groups in society to
have subordinated status because of their lack of power in society as a
whole. This approach seeks to eliminate the power disparities between
men and women, and between whites and non-whites, through the devel-
opment of laws and policies that directly redress those disparities.
1 3
From an anti-subordination perspective, both facially differentiating and
facially neutral policies are invidious only if they perpetuate racial or
Id. (footnote omitted).
12 I introduce the term "anti-subordination" as a descriptive label for the approach to
equal protection analysis explicated and advocated in this Article. I have chosen the term
"anti-subordination" because it best describes what I, and those who share my perspective,
view as the principal justification for race- or sex-specific policies.
Others have previously attempted to encompass this general approach with various de-
scriptive labels. Professor Scales, for example, prefers the phrase "incorporationist model."
Scales, supra note 2, at 435-36 (disputing notion that rules that account for unique reproduc-
tive capacities of women constitute special, unequal favoring of women).
Professor Karst uses the term "equality" to embody many of the same concepts that this
Article incorporates in the phrase "anti-subordination." His premise is that
the idea of equality carries a meaning quite removed from the empty tautology that like
cases should be treated alike. This meaning is not derived from dictionaries or deductive
logic, but from centuries of American experience. It is not a philosopher's universal, but
a culturally specific and evolving ideal. The ideal not only has substantive content; it is a
cluster of substantive values, with moral underpinnings solidly based in a particular
society's religious and philsophical traditions.
Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245, 249-50 (1983). Hence, although Karst does
not use the phrase "anti-subordination," he clearly does not accept the premises of the anti-
differentiation model.
Professor Dworkin's "banned sources" theory is similar to what this Article terms "anti-
subordination." See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 381-87 (1986). Dworkin summarizes the dif-
ference between a "banned sources" theory and a "banned categories" theory as follows: "The
banned sources theory would distinguish between affirmative action programs designed to help
blacks and Jim Crow laws designed to keep them in a state of economic and social subjugation.
The banned category theory would treat both in the same way." Id. at 386-87.
Some commentators have used the phrases "benign purpose" or "benign classifications"
to describe a model that permits some sex-specific rules to survive scrutiny. See, e.g., G.
Gunther, Constitutional Law 736-87 (1985) (discussing affirmative action case law, under
heading "The Benign Use of Quasi-Suspect and Suspect Criteria: Gender; Race"); Greenawalt,
Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Classifications in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L.
Rev. 559 (1975).
This viewpoint is often called "special treatment" by advocates of the anti-differentiation
perspective, see, e.g., Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 2, at 328, perhaps to attach a
pejorative label that highlights their disagreement with an anti-subordination approach.
13 Some proponents of sex-specific policies or actions justify these policies or actions only
in contexts where biological differences exist on the basis of race or sex. See generally Scales,
supra note 2, at 430-34 (explaining "bivalent" view, which places particular emphasis on bio-
logical differences between the sexes). This argument for sex-specific policies or actions is
deficient, in my view, because it does not allow institutions to account for social and historical
conditions in constructing new policies or actions to eliminate subordination.
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sexual hierarchy. 14
In contrast to the anti-differentiation approach, the anti-subordina-
tion perspective is a group-based perspective, in two ways. 15 First, it fo-
14 For example, a policy excluding persons who have primary child care responsibilities
from consideration for employment, although phrased in sex-neutral terms, would have a dis-
parate impact on women. It would also perpetuate a history of sexual hierarchy by penalizing
women for their societally imposed child care responsibilities. Hence, subordination oppo-
nents would seek to eliminate such a policy. See text accompanying notes 112-16 infra.
15 Professor Fiss, among the first to articulate the anti-subordination principle within equal
protection doctrine, argues that the equal protection principle need not be purely individualis-
tic, and that courts can and should consider "elements of groupism" in evaluating whether a
state's interest is legitimate. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
107, 123 (1976). For example, he argues that
[t]he paradigm of a state purpose that is illegitimate is couched in terms of a group:
"The desire to keep blacks in a position of subordination is an illegitimate state pur-
pose." And the standard of illegitimacy is constructed by attributing what might be
viewed as a group-oriented purpose to the Equal Protection Clause-to protect blacks
from hostile state action.
Id. at 123-24.
Although Fiss articulated a principle of anti-subordination, he did not attempt to resolve
the legitimacy of the use of race-specific policies to overcome subordination. Others have since
done so. The best compilation of writers on the anti-subordination perspective is Shades of
Brown: New Perspectives on School Desegregation (D. Bell ed. 1980) [hereinafter Shades of
Brown]; see also Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in The Politics of Law
96, 110-14 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (describing anti-discrimination law as legitimation of existing
class structure).
Professor Ely has also suggested that historical issues be considered in determining
whether a group is entitled to heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. See J. Ely, supra note 4. Ely's proposed framework, however, is quite different
from that proposed by this Article, especially in its consideration of sex discrimination issues.
Ely focuses primarily on questions of public, political power in determining which groups
have historically had power in the United States. Although the questions he asks are impor-
tant, he overlooks the importance of power in the private sphere. Many feminist writers have
noted the extensive oppression that women have faced in the private, family sphere through,
among other things, spousal battery, inequitable custody and child support arrangements, and
marital rape. See, e.g., K. Barry, Female Sexual Slavery (1979); S. Brownmiller, Against Our
Will: Men, Women and Rape (1975); A. Dworkin, Woman Hating (1974). By focusing pri-
marily on questions of political representation, Ely minimizes the significance of this form of
disempowerment in women's lives. He is seemingly baffled that women's majority status in the
population has not translated into equivalent influence on national politics, see J. Ely, supra
note 4, at 164-65, because he does not recognize the implications of women's lack of power
within the private sphere. His oversight is exemplified by the following statement: "'Some of
my best friends are Negro' got to be a parody of white hypocrisy, but the best friend of most
men really is a woman, which eliminates the real hostility and fear that persists among the
races." J. Ely, supra note 4, at 257 n.94.
The observation that a man's best friend is a woman provides no escape from oppression
for women who have been raped, battered, or otherwise abused. Ely's statement may reflect
women's importance to men; it ignores the oppression of women by men, and overlooks
women's historical disenfranchisement and dejure exclusion from the public, political process.
As such, Ely's perspective on sex discrimination exemplifies what Professor MacKinnon de-
scribes as a male point of view.
The law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women. The liberal state
coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a
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cuses on society's role in creating subordination. Second, it focuses on
the way in which this subordination affects, or has affected, groups of
people. 16 It is more invidious for women or blacks to be treated worse
than white men than for men or whites to be treated worse than black
women under this perspective, because of the differing histories and con-
texts of subordination faced by these groups.17 Anti-subordination pro-
gender.., through embodying and ensuring male control over women's sexuality at
every level, occasionally cushioning, qualifying or de jure prohibiting its excesses when
necessary to its normalization. Substantively, the way the male point of view frames an
experience is the way it is framed by state policy .... As male is the implicit reference
for human, maleness will be the measure of equality in sex discrimination law.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8
Signs 635, 644 (1983) (footnote omitted).
Thus, the central question, from a woman's perspective, is whether women experience
coercion and powerlessness in their relationships with men. Ely does not ask this question in
his analysis of the historical powerlessness of women in the political sphere. By contrast, this
Article assumes that an examination of women's historical powerlessness within both the pri-
vate and public spheres reveals that women are an oppressed group within our society.
16 Professor Freeman forcefully articulates the necessity of a group-based analysis:
The curious ideological phenomenon is that color blindness has become an abstraction
that has taken on a life of its own, one that can turn around to disappoint the hopes of
the very people on whose behalf it arose initially. Why should color blindness be an end
in itself, a reference point against which to test questions of racial discrimination? It has
become a way of abstracting the American black experience out of its own historical
setting to the point where all ethnics become fungible under the pressure of color blind-
ness. I don't think all ethnics are fungible; I think people have had very different expe-
riences, and that the ideology of fungibility is part of the process of refusing to deal with
the concreteness of black experience.
Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradiction, Rationalization, in Shades of
Brown, supra note 15, at 77; see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-15, at 1-22
(1978) ("[J]udicial rejection of the 'separate but equal' talisman seems to have been accompa-
nied by a potentially troublesome lack of sympathy for racial separateness as a possible expres-
sion of group solidarity." (footnotes omitted)).
17 Anti-subordination advocates argue that legal rules can be used affirmatively as a means
of ending historical patterns of patriarchy and white supremacy. Adrienne Rich, the feminist
poet and theorist, defines "patriarchy" in terms of subordination: "[A]ny kind of organization
in which males hold dominant power and determine which part females shall and shall not
play, and in which capabilities assigned to women are relegated generally to the mystical and
aesthetic and excluded from the practical and political realms." A. Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and
Silence 78 (1979).
Similarly, Professor Bell has written of the subordination of racial minorities in terms of
exclusion from the process of exercising power. As Bell argues, even the implementation of
equal protection remedies has thus far been marked by such exclusion.
The central issue in remedying past discrimination commonly has been conceived in the
following terms: "Conceding that blacks have been harmed by slavery, or segregation,
or discrimination, which groups of whites should pay the price or suffer the disadvan-
tage that may be incurred in implementing a policy nominally directed at rectifying that
harm?" This question, which focuses on the cost to whites of racial remedies rather
than on the necessity of relief for minorities, obviously has been framed by whites for
discussion with other whites. Their attitude is not unlike that of parents who, in the old
strict-upbringing days, might have hushed a protesting offspring with a curt, "Keep
quiet. We are talking about you, not to you."
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ponents therefore advocate the use of race- or sex-specific policies, such
as affirmative action, when those policies redress the subordination of
racial minorities or women.18
The courts have struggled with the choice between the anti-differen-
tiation and anti-subordination perspectives. The most obvious sources of
this tension have been the affirmative action cases, where the courts have
grappled with the issue of whether the principle of anti-differentiation
should be compromised by accomodation of race- or sex-specific policies
that are instituted to overcome a prior history of subordination of racial
minorities or women. Affirmative action, however, is not the only source
of this tension. This tension is also overt in the difference between the
courts' treatment of race and sex discrimination cases, the difference be-
tween strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny under constitutional
equal protection doctrine, and the difference between the courts' treat-
ment of statutory and constitutional claims of race or sex discrimination.
More broadly, the two principles offer differing perspectives on al equal
protection doctrine, and have differing implications at both stages of the
typical equal protection case: at the stage of establishing a prima facie
case19 and at the stage of justifying discriminatory policies or actions.
20
Bell, Bakke, supra note 5, at 3-4.
18 In general, this Article assumes that the anti-subordination perspective should be
premised on an analysis of whether women and minorities, the affected groups, perceive that
the particular program redresses subordination, and not whether the governmental entity in-
tended it to do so. However, there may be situations in which the subordinating motivations
of the governmental entity essentially undo the otherwise anti-subordinating effects of the pro-
gram. For example, if a law school instituted an affirmative action program to increase minor-
ity enrollment, and publicly announced that such a program was necessary because black
people are inherently unable to meet the necessary qualifications for law school admissions,
one would have to look at the entire context and conclude that the program did not redress
subordination. Part of that context would be the underlying motivation. The same affirmative
action program at another institution, without those invidious public statements, could be seen
as redressing subordination. Thus, to the extent that the motivations of a legislature or institu-
tion may affect the results of the program, the end result of this Article's analysis in a given
case may be compatible with, although not determined by, the results of a motivational analy-
sis. Legislative motivation is not addressed in depth in this Article because it would seem to be
the rare case where the legislature had a subordinating purpose yet the results of the legislation
helped alleviate subordination. The cases where such contrasting motivations exist often in-
volve old statutes where it may no longer be relevant what the legislature initially intended, so
long as the present effects of the legislation alleviate subordination. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974) (property tax exemption for widows). The harder cases are those in which
the original subordinating intent may also be the current legislature's intent. See, e.g., Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape law); see also Olsen,
Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 387, 402-04 (1984)
(critique of legislature's intent in enacting statutory rape laws). But even in these harder cases,
the inquiry should be how the current legislature's invidious intent impacts on women's lives.
If it does not further their subordination, motivation could be ignored.
19 See text accompanying notes 106-25 infra.
20 See text accompanying notes 126-201 infra.
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Although much of the scholarship on equal protection doctrine as-
sumes that the anti-differentiation principle is justifiably the dominant
perspective,21 a comparison of race and sex cases, 22 as well as of constitu-
tional and statutory cases, 23 reveals that the anti-subordination principle
better explains both much of the law and the aversion we feel to race and
sex discrimination.
24
I make this argument from a non-originalist perspective under
which I look to the text and history of the Constitution for a statement of
21 See notes 5-11 supra.
22 See text accompanying notes 60-98, 204-48 infra.
23 See text accompanying notes 51-59, 99-105 infra. This statutory/constitutional law
comparison does not consider the differences between the congressional "intent" underlying
each of these perspectives, because I do not believe that intent analyses should determine the
answers to difficult issues like the meaning of the concept of equal protection. However, to the
extent that an intent analysis is useful, it is probably more useful in interpreting recent statu-
tory material, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, than older constitutional material like the
fourteenth amendment. An examination of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 does reveal a pervasive concern for remedying the historical subordination of black peo-
ple. See, e.g., Bureau of Nat'l Af., supra note 1, at app. 103-362; U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, Legislative History of Titles VII and IX of Civil Rights Act of 1964
(n.d.). The same legislative history reflects virtually no concern about the subordination of
women. In fact, the prohibition against sex discrimination was added to Title VII of the Act
as an unfriendly amendment to kill the bill. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-84 (1964) (noting that
prohibition was adopted by a vote of 168-133). The history of the fourteenth amendment is
similar, with a focus on remedying the subordination of blacks to the exclusion of any consid-
eration of the subordination of other groups. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1872) ("We doubt very much whether any action of a state not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, win ever be held to
come within the purview of the [fourteenth amendment].").
24 In arguing that the anti-subordination principle better explains the appropriate frame-
work for equal protection analysis, I do not discount the importance and value of an individ-
ual-rights analysis. I recognize that race- and sex-specific policies can have a very powerful
impact on equal protection by virtue of their intrinsic differentiation on the basis of immutable
characteristics. But this Article argues that the courts have overemphasized the importance of
individual rights to the detriment of a group-based perspective. The anti-subordination per-
spective that is articulated in this Article melds together individual-rights and group-based
perspectives; thus, the anti-subordination perspective can be seen as a group-based articulation
of individual rights. For other examples of my attempt to combine group-based and individ-
ual-rights arguments, see Colker, Published Consentless Sexual Portrayals: A Proposed
Framework for Analysis, 35 Buffalo L. Rev. 39 (1986); Colker, Pornography and Privacy:
Towards the Development of a Group-Based Theory for Sex-Based Intrusions of Privacy, 1
Law & Inequality 191 (1983).
The argument that the anti-subordination principle is crucial to equal protection doctrine
is premised on the recognition that women and blacks have not achieved economic or political
parity in the United States. The following figures show that the income gap between blacks
and whites, and women and men, is still quite large, and not improving.
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explicit principles as well as fundamental aspirations. 25 Through such an
inquiry, I determine that the anti-subordination perspective is consistent
with the history of the equal protection clause26 and reflects a living aspi-
ration that will help us move towards a world of equality. Historically,
the equal protection principle developed to remedy a history of subordi-
nation against a particular group in society, blacks. Aspirationally, it
reminds us that no group should remain subordinated in our society and
that we should therefore take seriously the claims of women and of other
discrete minorities that they have been subjected to pervasive discrimina-
tion in our society.
The anti-differentiation principle, in contrast, does a disservice to
this history and fundamental aspiration by asserting that discrimination
against whites is as problematic as discrimination against blacks. 27 We
MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS (IN DOLLARS)
1970 1978 1984
All Workers 130 227 326
White 134 232 339
Male 157 279 403
Female 95 167 264
Black and Other 99 186 265
Male 113 218 304
Female 81 158 242
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 424,
Table No. 704 (101st ed. 1980); id. at 419, Table No. 704 (106th ed. 1986).
Although I recognize that there may come a day when blacks and women achieve full
equality, and therefore will no longer need the safeguards of an anti-subordination principle,
we are a long way from that day.
25 For an excellent discussion of the merits of the non-originalist perspective, see M. Perry,
Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay, ch. 6 (forthcoming 1988).
26 From a statutory perspective, I would similarly argue that the principle of anti-subordi-
nation is embodied in the history of the civil rights struggle and the legislation that was en-
acted as a response to that struggle. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 144 (1987), acknowledges the embodiment of the anti-sub-
ordination principle in Title VII. Id. at 1456-57.
27 This emphasis on preventing differentiation, with minimal consideration to subordina-
tion, is a relatively recent development. In the leading article on equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment, Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L.
Rev. 341 (1949), and in the subsequent book, J. tenBroek, Equal Under Law (1965), the au-
thors concluded that the phrase "equal" was of secondary importance to the phrase "protec-
tion" in the phrase "equal protection" within the fourteenth amendment. They argued that
the word "full" could have easily been used instead of the word "equal," since the purpose of
the amendment was to provide protection of the laws to all men. Tussman & tenBroek, supra
at 237. Under their interpretation, the fourteenth amendment embodies the principle of anti-
subordination-having as its highest purpose the provision of full citizenship to those previ-
ously denied.
Nevertheless, by 1976, in another influential article, Professor Fiss lamented that the pre-
vailing view of the fourteenth amendment was that it only required "color-blindness." Fiss,
supra note 15, at 119-20 ("The overarching obligation is to treat similar persons similarly,
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have not decided, as a nation, that all distinctions are invidious. We per-
mit distinctions on the basis of intelligence or ability. We only prohibit
distinctions that we have good reason to believe are biased or irrational,
28
and it is group-based experiences that primarily inform us as to which
kinds of distinctions are biased or irrational. Thus, the anti-subordina-
tion principle, by recognizing and drawing on the historical subordina-
tion of blacks and women, offers a substantive explanation for why
certain distinctions are subjected to closer scrutiny.
2 9
Even if the reader does not accept my assertion that the anti-subor-
dination principle is more faithful to our constitutional tradition and our
civil rights struggle, I believe that the reader can conclude that the anti-
subordination principle is needed for pragmatic reasons. It is simply a
more flexible doctrine that permits the courts or employers to use race-
or sex-specific remedies in some situations that call out for redress of
prior discrimination. It does not absolutely tie their hands by forbidding
the use of such remedies. I believe that courts and employers must be
able to use race- or sex-specific remedies because history demonstrates
the difficulty of achieving true equality through race- and sex-neutral
remedies. These pragmatic arguments will be explored throughout the
Article as I trace the history of race and sex discrimination doctrine and
the difficulties that the courts have had in fashioning effective remedies.
In this Article, I argue that the courts have made their choices be-
tween the anti-differentiation and anti-subordination perspectives with-
out a sound theoretical basis. The anti-differentiation perspective
developed pragmatically as a means to redressing subordination, rather
than as a theoretical response to the core problem with race or sex dis-
crimination-differentiation or subordination. Historically, differentia-
tion has been a powerful tool in perpetuating the subordination of
minorities and women through segregation and exclusion. In the early
declaring certain individual characteristics-such as color-irrelevant.") Highlighting this
general overemphasis on anti-differentiation, Fiss argued for the need to consider group-based
subordination. See id. at 123-24; note 5 supra.
28 Professor Perry describes this case law as asserting that distinctions should not be made
on "morally irrelevant" bases. See Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualizaton and
Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1065-67 (1979).
29 Professor Sunstein has engaged in a similar inquiry and has reached a similar conclu-
sion. He has characterized the fundamental constitutional aspiration as an aspiration to over-
come "naked preferenes"-to prevent "the distribution of resources or opportunities to one
group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw
political power to obtain what they want." Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution,
84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 1689 (1984). Professor Sunstein uses the naked preferences doctrine
to explain many constitutional provisions. In contrast, I am using the anti-subordination prin-
ciple only to explain the equal protection clause. The anti-subordination principle could there-
fore be seen as a more specific formulation of Sunstein's naked preference doctrine-it
translates what "naked preferences" means in the equal protection context, i.e., subordination.
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equal protection cases, the principle of anti-differentiation was useful to
abolish racial segregation and other practices that excluded blacks. 30 Ac-
cordingly, the courts may not have seen the need to choose between the
anti-differentiation and anti-subordination perspectives; they could de-
scribe the discrimination under either framework. The courts may there-
fore have uttered global assertions of anti-differentiation such as
"separate can never be equal" when what they meant was "enforced seg-
regation of blacks prevents their attainment of equality." I examine
some of these early cases and show that the Supreme Court's primary
concern was anti-subordination, despite some misleading statements
about anti-differentiation. And I argue that that principle once again
dominates the courts' analysis of equal protection doctrine.
The Court's recent affirmative action cases provide us with hope
that the Court is rediscovering the value of the principle of anti-subordi-
nation.31 These cases have shown that differentiation can be an equally
powerful tool for the redress of subordination. However, the Court has
not yet examined how the principle of anti-differentiation continues to
limit much of the Court's equal protection work outside the area of af-
firmative action. In this Article, I argue that the principle of anti-subor-
dination should be more firmly embedded in all of equal protection
doctrine.
Accordingly, the framework I propose brings the principle of anti-
subordination to the forefront of equal protection doctrine. The frame-
work retains the bilevel inquiry that occurs in each equal protection law-
suit: the examination of the plaintiff's prima facie case, and the analysis
of the defendant's proffered justification for the challenged policy or ac-
tion.32 Yet the proposed framework reformulates the substance of each
stage of the inquiry. First, the plaintiff would no longer be required to
show the discriminatory intent behind a neutral policy or be able to es-
tablish a prima facie case of discrimination simply by asserting that a
policy or action facially differentiates. Instead, every plaintiff would have
to establish that the policy or action had a disparate impact on members
30 See text accompanying notes 70-75 infra.
31 See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987); United States v. Para-
dise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
32 The existing equal protection framework was taken, in large part, from the leading arti-
cle, Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27. In addition to the two stages discussed in this Arti-
cle, a third stage exists in some cases, in which the plaintiff tries to show that the defendant's
articulated justification is not, in fact, the real reason for its actions, and instead, is a pretext
for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1972) (Ti-
tle VII case). This step primarily occurs in cases in which the defendant has used a race- or
sex-neutral policy, and is therefore not of major concern in the context of this Article, which
focuses on the use of race- or sex-specific policies.
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of plaintiff's race or sex.33 This reformulation elevates anti-subordina-
tion over anti-differentiation in two ways: first, by emphasizing the effect
of policies or actions on groups rather than individuals, and second, by
eliminating the need to prove discriminatory motivation. Under this pro-
posed approach, if the plaintiff could not show disparate impact a court
would uphold a race- or sex-specific policy or action without ever getting
to the stage of justification. By valuing impact over differentiation at the
prima facie case stage, the framework ensures that only policies or ac-
tions that might be subordinating would reach the stage of justification.
In its second phase, the proposed approach would focus the justifi-
cation inquiry on the principle of anti-subordination rather than on nebu-
lous constructs of strict or intermediate scrutiny, which leave courts
uncertain about what normative principles underlie the level of scru-
tiny.3 4 Only a goal of anti-subordination would justify a race- or sex-
specific policy or action; no other justification would be permitted under
the new framework. Courts would be unable to weaken the level of scru-
tiny to permit other kinds of justifications.
3 5
Thus, under the equal protection framework proposed in this Arti-
cle, it would be permissible for a state actor to use facially differentiating
policies to redress subordination; it would not be permissible for a state
actor to use facially differentiating policies that perpetuate subordination.
Indeed, the essential inquiry in any equal protection case would be how
differentiating policies or actions connect to subordination, not whether
policies are phrased in race- or sex-specific terms. The courts and private
parties should be able to implement race- and sex-specific policies where
they are best suited to the task of remedying subordination.
In order to provide a context for the proposed framework's reformu-
lation, Part I reviews the evolution of equal protection jurisprudence in
both the race and sex areas. Part II then examines more closely the
courts' application of the principles of anti-differentiation and anti-subor-
dination at the prima facie case stage. Part III, the core of this Article,
discusses the way in which courts have applied, and should apply, these
principles at the justification stage.3 6 The discussion in Part III addresses
the stage of justification generally, and then focuses on cases challenging
discrimination in education, because these cases best illustrate the courts'
inconsistent treatment of race and sex cases. Part IV offers an expanded
presentation and application of this Article's proposed new framework
for analyzing equal protection cases.
This Article enters the debate at a time when equal protection juris-
33 See text accompanying notes 111-22 infra.
34 See text accompanying notes 60-98 infra.
35 See text accompanying notes 91-105 infra.
36 See text accompanying notes 126-248 infra.
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prudence is at a crossroads. Affirmative action programs, the embodi-
ment of the anti-subordination philosophy, are under continued attack,
but the Court has recently breathed new life into such programs. 37 The
Reagan Administration's efforts to impose its own extreme anti-differen-
tiation perspective on the courts have been strongly rebuffed. 38 This Ar-
ticle builds on these recent victories by expanding the use of the anti-
subordination principle beyond the affirmative action cases, to all equal
protection claims. Such expansion is necessary to prod the courts in a
direction that better serves the people that the equal protection clause
should protect.
I
THE EVOLUTION OF EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES IN
THE RACE AND SEX CASES
Since the beginning of the 1950s, 39 many black plaintiffs have
37 See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987); United States v. Para-
dise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
38 This perspective has been most visible within the United States Department of Justice.
In its opposition to affirmative action programs, the Reagan Justice Department has argued
that race- and sex-specific goals and quotas unconstitutionally discriminate against white men.
See, e.g., Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1064 (United States opposing race conscious relief in case in
which it had earlier intervened as party plaintiff). The recent affirmative action decisions have
rejected the Administration's position. See id.; Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1457; Local 28, Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 3019
(1986); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
Yet, the Reagan Administration's pure anti-differentiation perspective has found expres-
sion in other ways. During my tenure with the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Depart-
ment, 1981-1985, I observed that the Division shifted its emphasis from disparate impact
claims to different treatment claims, especially in the employment and housing areas. This
shift was most obvious in the latter area, because the Department began to require its attorneys
to allege proof of discriminatory intent in order to bring a housing discrimination case. Proof
of intent is tantamount to proof of different treatment because it requires that the plaintiff
identify a race- or sex-specific motivation as part of the prima facie case.
39 The development of heightened scrutiny in race discrimination cases actually began long
before the 1950s. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying
"most rigid scrutiny" yet upholding internment of Japanese-Americans during Second World
War); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (involving Texas statute forbidding participa-
tion of blacks in primary elections); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (invalidat-
ing all white jury); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 721 (1945) (involving blacks excluded from library training class).
One of the most important moments in the development of both heightened scrutiny and
the anti-subordination principle came in United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938),
a case outside the area of race discrimination. Under rational basis review, the Court upheld a
federal statute prohibiting interstate shipment of "filled milk." Id. at 154. In his famous foot-
note, Justice Stone, writing for the majority, suggested that a more stringent standard of re-
view might be appropriate in certain cases in which "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." Id. at 152 n.4. For
discussion of the development of this doctrine, see generally Cover, The Origins of Judicial
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brought cases alleging violations of the right to equal protection on either
statutory4° or constitutional41 grounds, in which they challenged race-
specific policies or actions that excluded them from important educa-
tional, employment, and general societal opportunities. 42 These policies
and actions were invalid from both anti-differentiation and anti-subordi-
nation perspectives because they explicitly differentiated on the basis of
race and subordinated blacks. Congress responded with major civil
rights legislation that made such race-specific policies or actions unlawful
in the areas of public accomodations, 43 federally financed programs or
activities,44 voting,45 housing,46 and employment.47
As the case law developed, courts had to confront two crucial issues.
First, they had to determine whether evidence of a race-specific policy,
Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 Yale L.J. 1287 (1982) (discussing evolution of
judicial role since Justice Stone's Carolene Products footnote); Dimond, Strict Construction
and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting
Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (1982) (arguing that framers of
equal protection clause intended it to be broadly interpreted). For views critical of the devel-
opment of equal protection doctrine through judicial activism, see R. Berger, Government by
Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977) (arguing for more nar-
row interpretation of equal protection clause); A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress 116-73 (1970) (finding the Warren Court's school segregation and legislative reappor-
tionment opinions to be guided by increasingly irrelevant social policy goals); Wechsler, To-
ward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 31-34 (1959) (finding
Brown v. Board of Education "unprincipled"); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 537 (rejecting need for a principle of equality).
40 Several federal statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of race or sex. See, e.g.,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1982); Title IX, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-1686 (1982).
41 "Constitutional equal protection doctrine" refers to the doctrine used in race- or sex-
based discrimination cases brought directly under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. This clause provides: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
42 The leading case is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning
separate but equal doctrine in context of racial segregation of schools); see also Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (racially segregated public parks); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (racially segregated housing); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(state statute prohibiting interracial marriage).
43 Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201-07, 78 Stat. 245
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to -6 (1982)); see also Title III of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 301-304, 78 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000b to -3 (1982)) (public facilities).
44 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 252-53
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to -6 (1982)); see also Title IV of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 401-409, 78 Stat. 246-49 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000c to -9 (1982)) (public education).
45 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
46 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-806, 82 Stat. 81-
84 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3606 (1982)).
47 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253-66 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1982)).
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action, or motivation-explicit "different treatment" 4 8-is always re-
quired to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, or whether evi-
dence of "disparate impact, '49 alone, is sufficient. The second issue
confronting the Court was the level of scrutiny to apply to the justifica-
tions proffered for the discrimination once a prima facie case had been
proved.5° Each issue will be treated in turn.
A. The Different Treatment/Disparate Impact Controversy
The method of proof issue first arose in cases brought under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,51 in which blacks challenged policies
or actions phrased in race-neutral language that nonetheless had a dispa-
rate impact in excluding them from employment opportunities. 52 When
48 The different treatment method of proof can take one of two forms. The plaintiff may
either prove discrimination by showing that the policy or action is phrased in race- or sex-
specific language, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state law prohibiting sale of
beer to males under age of 21 and to females under age of 18 held unconstitutional); Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (rule prohibiting women with pre-school age chil-
dren from being hired violated Title VII of Civil Rights Act), or may prove that a policy or
action is race- or sex-specific in practice, although stated in neutral terms. The leading case in
the latter area under Title VII is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in
which a civil rights activist alleged that his discharge was racially motivated in violation of the
statute. Although he was given racially neutral reasons for the discharge, he alleged that race
was the real reason. The McDonnell Douglas Court developed a framework for making out a
prima facie case under Title VII in such a situation. The framework gives plaintiffs the initial
burden of showing:
(1) that they belong to a protected class,
(2) that they applied for and were qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants,
(3) that, despite their qualifications, they were rejected, and
(4) that, after they were rejected the position remained open and the employer contin-
ued to seek applicants of the complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
49 The disparate impact approach was first validated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in which the Court struck down an intelligence test and
high school diploma requirement for departmental transfers because such a requirement had a
disparate impact on blacks. For further discussion of the disparate impact test, see Chamallas,
Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise
of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 305 (1983); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Im-
pact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 36 (1977);
Hsia, The Effects Test: New Directions, 17 Santa Clara L. Rev. 777 (1977); Perry, The Dis-
proportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540 (1977);
Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24
UCLA L. Rev. 581 (1977); Note, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose: Rethink-
ing Equal Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 334 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Rethinking
Equal Protection Doctrine]; Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Ar-
gument of Invidious Intent, 93 Yale LJ. 111 (1983).
5o See text accompanying notes 60-105 infra.
51 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1982).
52 See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (payment of poll tax required as condition for voting perpetuated prior overt exclusion
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these challenges were successful, similar attacks were made on constitu-
tional grounds. The Supreme Court ultimately resolved the different
treatment/disparate impact controversy through an analysis of the prag-
matic implications of each choice.53 Although the Court allowed proof
of either different treatment or disparate impact to establish a prima facie
case in a Title VII suit, it later required that cases brought directly under
the Constitution be proved with evidence of different treatment. 54 In or-
der to establish a prima facie case under the equal protection clause itself,
a plaintiff must always demonstrate that a defendant acted with a race-
or sex-conscious motive, regardless of the impact that the defendant's
facially neutral policy may have had on blacks or women.
55
The Court's formulation of the permissible methods of proof in stat-
utory and constitutional cases can be seen as a choice between the anti-
subordination and anti-differentiation perspectives. The statutory
method of proof embodies the anti-subordination approach because it
does not require proof of individualized motivation and permits consider-
ation of the group-based effects of an action.56 By contrast, the constitu-
tional method of proof embodies the anti-differentiation perspective.
Nevertheless, neither the Supreme Court nor commentators have de-
scribed the choice in those terms. The Court instead views the choice
pragmatically and has declined to apply the disparate impact test to con-
stitutional cases because of the effect such a decision would have on ex-
isting race- and sex-neutral policies that produce disparate impact.
57
of blacks from right to vote); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972)
(plant racially segregated until 1962, with promotions and transfers thereafter conditioned on
biased recommendations); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir.
1970) (company hired blacks only as city drivers prior to 1965, and then prohibited transfers
to "white" job categories).
53 See text accompanying note 54 infra.
54 Compare Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (evidence of intent not required under Title VII) with
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (evidence of intent required under Constitution).
55 Davis, 426 U.S. at 246 (disparate impact of employment test did not establish prima facie
case of discrimination).
56 Under the statutory disparate impact method of proof, the sole proof presented is the
group-based effect of the policy or action. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329
(1977) ("[P]laintiff need only show that the facially neutral standards in question select appli-
cants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern.").
57 In Davis, 426 U.S. at 229, the Supreme Court justified its unwillingness to use the more
lenient effects test established under Title VII with the following pragmatic statement:
[Title VII requires that tests] be validated in terms of job performance in any one of
several ways.... However this process proceeds, it involves a more probing judicial
review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and
executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, with-
out discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not disposed to adopt this more rigorous
standard for the purposes of applying the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in cases
such as this.
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent
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Anti-subordination advocates show similar pragmatism in strongly en-
dorsing the use of the disparate impact method of proof in constitutional
as well as statutory cases; they focus on the relative ease in pleading con-
stitutional claims rather than on the greater theoretical consistency in-
volved.58 Even some anti-differentiation commentators have been willing
to advocate the statutory disparate impact model, because they realize
that the constitutional model places nearly impossible hurdles in front of
the plaintiff.59 Thus, pragmatic rather than theoretical concerns have de-
termined both the courts' and commentators' perspective on this crucial
issue.
B. Resolving the Level of Scrutiny
The second important issue confronting the Court arose in the next
phase of analysis, the stage of justification. The Court had to determine
what arguments by the defendant could be permitted to justify race- or
sex-specific policies or actions, once the plaintiff had shown a prima facie
case of discrimination. This issue first arose in the constitutional chal-
lenges to race-specific policies in higher education that allegedly
subordinated blacks.6 °
compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another
would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be
more burdensome to the poor and the average black than to the more affluent white.
Given that rule, such consequences would perhaps be likely to follow. However, in
our view, extension of the rule beyond those areas where it is already applicable by
reason of statute, such as in the field of public employment, should await legislative
prescription.
Id. at 247-48. For further criticism of the Court's rationale for requiring proof of different
treatment in constitutional cases, see Note, Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine, supra note
49, at 349-51.
58 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 48-49; Hsia, supra note 49, at 790-803.
59 For example, Professor Williams, who is an ardent anti-differentiation theorist, argues
for the use of the statutory disparate impact model, seemingly unconcerned with how it devi-
ates from a pure anti-differentiation perspective. She seems to favor this model because of its
powerful ability to remedy structural inequalities. See Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note
2, at 330-31.
60 For an excellent description of the development of this case law, see R. Kluger, Simple
Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equal-
ity (1975). According to Kluger, in 1945 the South was spending twice as much to educate
each white child as it was per black child.
It was investing four times as much in white school plants, paying white teachers 30
percent higher, and virtually ignoring the critical logistics of transporting rural Negroes
to their schoolhouses. In 1944, the seventeen segregating states spent a total of $42
million busing white children to their schools; on transporting colored children, they
spent a little more than one million dollars.... IThere was still no institution in the
South where a Negro could pursue studies for a doctorate. Excluding Howard Univer-
sity, there was one accredited medical school in the South for Negroes, but twenty-nine
for whites.
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In the late 1940s, there were two practical routes to expansion of
blacks' educational opportunities in higher education: to press for the
opening of all-white universities to blacks, or to insist that the southern
states build separate and truly equal facilities. In 1948, the Supreme
Court held in Sipuel v. Board ofRegents61 that states could determine for
themselves the best way to create these opportunities. Although the
Court recognized that blacks were entitled to receive quality higher edu-
cation, it permitted the state of Oklahoma to create a separate law school
for blacks rather than admit a black plaintiff to a white law school.
Other states responded by opening institutions of higher education
for blacks to avoid desegregating white institutions. The NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (LDF) challenged that response because of the message of
inferiority it sent to both blacks and whites about blacks' intellectual ca-
pabilities62 and brought the case of Sweatt v. Painter63 to argue more
strongly than it had in Sipuel that the Supreme Court should overrule
Plessy v. Ferguson 64 and rule that segregation had no place in education.
The Court's opinion in Sweatt acknowledged the link between sepa-
rate education and subordination. For the first time, the Court recog-
nized the subjective factors that caused the black institution to be inferior
Id. at 256-57.
About one-fourth of the entire black population was functionally illiterate. Id. at 257
(citing Ambrose Caliver, senior specialist in Negro education in United States Office of Educa-
tion). Although blacks had GI benefits to attend college, few spots were available for them in
the nation's segregated facilities. Id. The few black colleges that existed were flooded with
applications, most of which had to be rejected for lack of space. For example, the Howard
Medical School accepted 70 out of 1,000 applicants and the law school accepted 50 out of 500
applicants. Id.
61 332 U.S. 631 (1948). The plaintiff, Ada Lois Sipuel, had applied to the University of
Oklahoma Law School, the only law school in the state. She was rejected because Oklahoma
law prohibited education of both races in the same facility. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 199
Okla. 36, 40,45, 180 P.2d 135, 139, 144 (1947). Oklahoma had established a program where it
financed out-of-state law education for blacks rather than desegregate the white state law
school. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that it was not unconstitutional to defer the in-
stallation of a law school for blacks until the need for one was made clear. Id. at 40-41, 180
P.2d at 139-140. The United States Supreme Court handed down a unanimous, per curiam
opinion obligating Oklahoma to provide the plaintiff with a legal education in conformity with
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment "as soon as it does for any other
group." Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 633. The Oklahoma court then ordered the defendants to comply
with the Supreme Court. Sipuel, 199 Okla. at 588, 190 P.2d at 438. The Oklahoma Board of
Regents created a separate law school for blacks. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus in
the Supreme Court, but the Court denied the motion, making a narrow finding that, on re-
mand, the state trial court had complied with the Court's mandate by barring the state from
raising as a defense the plaintiff's failure to demand a separate but equal legal education.
Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 150 (1948).
62 R. Kluger, supra note 60, at 260.
63 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
64 163 U.S. 537 (1886). In Plessy, the Court had upheld the separate but equal doctrine by
permitting Louisiana to have separate railway cars for blacks and whites.
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to the white institution, and ordered a black student admitted to a school
previously restricted to whites. 65 However, the Court refrained from
overruling Plessy,66 leaving plaintiffs to argue in individual cases that in-
dividual schools for blacks were unequal to their corresponding white
schools.
67
Faced with the prospect of arguing cases of unequal educational fa-
cilities one by one for the next half century, the LDF pushed for a
stronger statement from the Court about the harm to blacks caused by
segregation. Finally, in 1954, the Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board
of Education68  that racially separate education cannot be equal
education. 6
9
A superficial examination of Brown suggests that the Court was em-
phasizing the principle of anti-differentiation over the principle of anti-
subordination in its ruling.70 However, closer examination shows that
the anti-subordination principle dominated the Court's analysis.7' Post-
Brown courts have focused on the strong anti-differentiation statement
from the Brown Court, namely, that separate can never be equal,72 and
overlooked that Court's central concern for remedying the subordination
of blacks.73 Applying a "strict scrutiny" standard, post-Brown courts
have permitted virtually no justifications for racially-differentiating laws
or policies, 74 prompting Professor Gunther to describe strict scrutiny as
65 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635.
66 Id. at 636.
67 Id.; see also Kluger, supra note 60, at 284. By emphasizing the subjective factors that
made the two schools unequal, the Court opened the way for a recognition of the principle that
separate cannot be equal.
68 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
69 Id. at 495.
70 See id. ("Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
71 The Court adopted the following finding from one of the lower courts:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon
the colored children .... A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the education
and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits
that they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Id. at 494. It is interesting to note that Brown viewed integration as beneficial only to black
students; it did not consider the possibility that integration might benefit white students as
well. In addition, the Court seemed to contemplate the desegregation only of white institu-
tions; the desegregation of black institutions was left an open question. Both of these observa-
tions support the conclusion that the Court was using an anti-subordination approach.
72 Although the Brown Court ruled only that Plessy was inapplicable in the education con-
text, decisions that followed made clear that "separate but equal" was unconstitutional in
every context. See G. Gunther, supra note 12, at 639 & n.1 (1985).
73 See note 71 supra.
74 The kinds of justifications that courts have accepted have been influenced by the method
of proof used to prove discrimination. Where the plaintiff uses the different treatment method
of proof there has been a stronger presumption of invalidity at the justification stage than
where the plaintiff uses the disparate impact method of proof. However, this presumption of
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"fatal in fact."' 75
Yet, the strict standard of scrutiny did not survive importation to
other, non-race-based claims of equal protection violation, such as claims
of sex discrimination. In the early sex discrimination cases, male plain-
tiffs brought constitutional challenges to preferential policies for wo-
men, 76 and women challenged subordinating sex-specific policies.
77
After exploring various levels of scrutiny, the Court settled on approach-
ing these cases with an "intermediate" level of scrutiny, under which
some sex-specific policies or actions were invalidated, while others
survived.7
8
Intermediate scrutiny, or "intensified rational basis scrutiny" has
developed gradually in the sex discrimination context.79 Before the ad-
vent of modem equal protection doctrine on sex-based classifications,
courts were relatively unconcerned about the subordination of women.
The courts easily accepted justifications for sex-specific policies or actions
that served to perpetuate, rather than eliminate, the subordination of wo-
men to men. For example, in 1873, in Bradwell v. Illinois,80 the Court
invalidity has been especially strong in the race context: strict scrutiny has almost always
rendered race-specific rules invalid. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
75 Id. No one formulation of strict scrutiny exists. Compare Regents of Univ. of Calif. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J., joined by White, J.) ("[R]acial and ethnic distinc-
tions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examina-
tion.") with id. at 361-62 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[O]ur review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict-not
'strict in theory and fatal in fact,' because it is stigma that causes fatality-but strict and
searching nonetheless."). Justice Powell's formulation seems more purely to embody the anti-
differentiation perspective than does the formulation suggested by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun. The Court has also used modifications of the Powell formulation.
In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the Supreme Court stated that "to pass constitu-
tional muster, [racial classifications] must be 'necessary... to the accomplishment' of their
legitimate purpose." Id. at 432 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)); see
also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (Burger, C.J., joined by White and
Powell, JJ.) ("Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees.");
id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit
any but the most exact connection between justification and classification.").
76 See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (male plaintiff challenged property tax
exemption for women).
77 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (female plaintiff challenged statutory prefer-
ence for male estate administrators).
78 Thus, while in the race context the justification process has been virtually meaningless
unless the plaintiff relies on the disparate impact method of proof, see note 74 supra, the justifi-
cation stage is always important in the gender discrimination context. Under intermediate
scrutiny, the defendant must prove that a sex-specific policy or action served an important
objective and was substantially related to achieving that objective.
79 See generally G. Gunther, supra note 12, at 642-69.
8o 83 U.S. 130 (1873). The petitioner argued that the privileges and immunities clause of
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upheld a rule against women practicing law. Justice Bradley, in his fa-
mous concurrence, justified this rule on the basis that "civil law, as well
as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respec-
tive spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender."81 Indeed, until the 1940s, virtually all
of the cases challenging sex-specific classifications involved such subordi-
nating views of women.
In these early cases, the Court did not even apply an equal protec-
tion framework. 2 Hence, it upheld sex-based distinctions without in-
quiry into the problems of differentiation or subordination. It was not
until the 1970s that the Court began to move toward intermediate scru-
tiny as a means to redress the subordination of women. In Reed v.
Reed,8 3 the Court purported to use rational basis scrutiny in striking
down an Idaho statute that provided a mandatory preference for males
over females in the selection of the administrators of estates, but the
Court actually applied a heightened level of scrutiny.8 4 Two years later,
in Frontiero v. Richardson,8 5 a plurality of the Court used heightened
scrutiny to invalidate a statute that presumed that servicemen but not
servicewomen were the major providers in households.8 6 The plurality
the fourteenth amendment, rather than the equal protection clause, provided her with the right
to become a member of the Illinois bar. The majority rejected that argument, finding that the
right to practice law is not guaranteed by the privileges and immunities clause.
81 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
82 For example, in Bradwell the plaintiff alleged a violation of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 138. In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908),
the plaintiff alleged a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, under
the rubric of substantive due process.
83 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
84 A unanimous Court stated that the appropriate test was whether the classification was
"reasonable, not arbitrary, and [rested] upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation"-the traditional rational basis test. Id. at 76
(quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). However, the "fair and
substantial relation" language in Reed acquired more significance than it had in prior cases.
For example, in the earlier case of Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), the Court upheld a
statute that prohibited women from working as bartenders unless they were the wife or daugh-
ter of a bartender. The Court accepted the justification that the statute served the state interest
of protecting society's morals, despite the strong suggestion that the real purpose of the statute
was to protect the male monopoly on bartending. The Court accepted this justification under
rational basis scrutiny, because it found that the statute was "not without a basis in reason."
Id. at 467. By contrast, in Reed, the state offered the justifications that the sex-based rule
would prevent intrafamily conflict, see 404 U.S. at 76-77, and, as a matter of administrative
convenience, favor those who, on average, would have more financial experience. See Brief for
Appellee at 12, Reed, 404 U.S. at 71, cited in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683
(1973). While these justifications were arguably as strong as those presented in Goesaert, the
Court upheld the bartending restrictions in Goesaert and overturned the restrictions on estate
administrators in Reed.
85 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
86 The armed services had a rule providing married men with an extra stipend to support
their families. Married women, by contrast, received this stipend only if they could establish




There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was
rationalized by an attitude of "romantic paternalism" which, in practi-
cal effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.... As a result
of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden
with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed,
throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our
society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the
pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold of-
fice, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married
women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey
property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children .... And
although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women
were denied even that right-which is itself "preservative of other ba-
sic civil and political rights"-until adoption of the Nineteenth
Amendment half a century later.8
7
The Frontiero Court used this history to justify the application of
what it termed "strict judicial scrutiny."88 Despite this label, the scrutiny
employed by the Frontiero Court, like the scrutiny used in later sex dis-
crimination cases, was not as probing as the scrutiny used in race dis-
crimination cases.89 The Court's decision in Frontiero exemplifies the
development of this less probing model within modem sex-based equal
protection doctrine. After justifying the use of heightened scrutiny, the
Court considered justifications for the sex-specific policy, noting that the
statutes in question were "not in any sense designed to rectify the effects
of past discrimination against women." 90 The Court thus suggested that
their husband's financial dependence upon them. Id. at 678. Wives were thus presumed to be
dependent upon husbands who were in the military, but husbands were not presumed to be
dependent on their military wives.
87 Id. at 684 (footnotes omitted).
88 Id. at 689.
89 While the plurality opinion in Frontiero purported to use strict scrutiny to strike down a
sex-based classification, the analysis was not as stringent as that previously used in the race
context. Under a traditional strict scrutiny approach, the Court would not have closely ana-
lyzed a state objective unless that objective was arguably compelling. By contrast, in Frontiero
the Court focused on whether the government did, in fact, save money by having an irrebut-
table presumption of dependency for the spouses of men but not for the spouses of women. See
411 U.S. at 690. Since this purported justification only rose to the level of administrative
convenience, it could easily have been dismissed even under the less rigid scrutiny used in
Reed. Indeed, the Court relied heavily on the prior reasoning in Reed, see id. at 689-90, and
was therefore really using a heightened rational basis level scrutiny, rather than the "strict
scrutiny" it purported to employ. Today, the Court is playing fewer games of verbal gymnas-
tics with the level of scrutiny. It admits that sex-based discrimination analysis has its own,
"intermediate" level of scrutiny and seems to be fairly consistent in its description of that level
of scrutiny. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-27 (1982).
90 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 698 n.22.
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it was appropriate to consider the principle of anti-subordination in rul-
ing on the constitutionality of a sex-specific rule.
Unfortunately, it soon became clear that anti-subordination was not
the only justification for sex-specific policies that the Court was willing to
accept. Later cases revealed that other justifications were also to be con-
sidered, justifications that reflected a weak anti-differentiation model
without an anti-subordination foundation.
A year after Frontiero, the range of justifications for sex-specific pol-
icies or actions emerged more clearly in Kahn v. Shevin,91 in which the
Court used an explicitly lower level of scrutiny than that which it had
purported to employ in Frontiero. In Kahn, a widower challenged a state
property tax exemption that was available only to widows, blind persons,
or totally and permanently disabled persons. 92 The Supreme Court up-
held the statute using the Reed heightened rational basis test,93 and its
analysis provided the state with wide discretion in justifying sex-specific
policies.
94
Two years later, the Court's decision in Craig v. Boren 95 made clear
that intermediate scrutiny was to be the standard of review in sex-dis-
crimination cases. 96 Invalidating an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the
sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 and to females under 18, the Court
linked the use of intermediate scrutiny to its ability to consider sex-spe-
cific justifications, but bypassed an anti-subordination analysis because
Oklahoma did not suggest that "the age-sex differential was enacted to
... compensat[e] for previous deprivations."
97
These cases illustrate the general inconsistency on the Court's part
in applying the principles of anti-differentiation and anti-subordination.
In constructing the stage of justification, the Court developed a stronger
anti-differentiation perspective in race cases than in sex cases by exhibit-
ing less toleration of race-specific policies or actions than of sex-specific
policies or actions.98
91 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
92 Id. at 352.
93 See id. at 335; note 84 supra.
94 First, the Kahn Court examined empirical evidence that widows face financial difficul-
ties. 416 U.S. at 353 nn.4-6. Second, it discussed the appropriate level of scrutiny. Id. at 355.
After citing Reed, it analogized the statute to any state tax law and noted the wide discretion
that states have in enacting tax statutes. It proceeded to apply the lenient rational basis stan-
dard for such legislation, and found the statute "well within" the appropriate limits. Id.
95 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
96 See id. at 197.
97 Id. at 198 n.6. For a discussion of how Craig would be analyzed under the framework
proposed in this Article, see note 171 infra.
98 As was shown earlier, a similar inconsistency has emerged in the Court's construction of
the framework for the prima facie case. The Court developed a stronger anti-differentiation
perspective in constitutional cases (where it requires proof of "different treatment") than in
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Mirroring, to some degree, these developments in the case law, Con-
gress's actions have also reflected dissatisfaction with the anti-differentia-
tion model in the area of sex discrimination. Although Congress enacted
civil rights legislation that made some sex-specific policies or actions un-
lawful in the areas of federally financed education, 99 credit, 1°° and em-
ployment, 101 the sloppiness of the constitutional sex-discrimination
model has carried over to the statutory context. The statutory model of
equal protection is riddled with exceptions that perpetuate women's sub-
ordination, the most egregious of which is that sex-specific employment
discrimination claims under Title VII can be defended with arguments of
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ).10 2 Title VII contains the
BFOQ exception for sex-specific policies, but not for race-specific poli-
cies, with the result that some sex-specific rules are allowed even though
they have a discriminatory impact.103 Similarly, Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 contains numerous sex-based exceptions to its
antidiscrimination provisions. 104 Thus, like the intermediate standard of
scrutiny in the Court's constitutional decisions,10 5 this legislation created
exceptions to the principle of anti-differentiation that do not exist in the
racial area. While generally proceeding under the guiding principle of
anti-differentiation, the Court and Congress have permitted many more
statutory cases (where it permits proof of different treatment or disparate impact). See text
accompanying notes 51-59 supra.
99 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373-75
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982)).
100 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 22 Stat. 1521-24 (codified as
amended at 14 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982)).
101 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716(c), 78 Stat.
253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1982)).
102 Section 703(e) of Title VII permits sex-based discrimination "in those certain instances
where.., sex.., is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). This
exception applies also to religion and national origin, but not to race. Id.
103 See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding
mandatory leave rules for pregnant women); Backus v. Baptist Medical Centers, 510 F. Supp.
1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (upholding rule barring male nurses in hospital obstetrics and gynecol-
ogy ward), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). For further discussion of the
effects of the BFOQ defense, see text accompanying notes 183-89 infra.
104 Title LX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982), prohib-
its discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance. This nondiscrimination provision, however, does not apply to military
institutions, public educational institutions with traditional and continuing single-sex admis-
sions policies, social fraternities or sororities, voluntary youth service organizations, American
Legion Boy or Girl conferences, father-son or mother-daughter activities at educational insti-
tutions, or awards in beauty pageants. Id. § 1681(a)(4)-(9).
105 Although the labels "strict" and "intermediate" scrutiny are not used in the statutory
context, the BFOQ exception to Title VII has a remarkably similar effect on the relative treat-
ment of race and sex cases. See note 78 supra; text accompanying notes 183-89 infra.
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justifications for sex-specific policies or actions than for racially differen-
tiating policies or actions.
II
THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-
DIFFERENTIATION AND ANTI-SUBORDINATION
PRINCIPLES IN THE PRIMA FACIE
CASE STAGE
Courts do not consider all legislative differentiations presumptively
invalid; instead, they generally defer to the right of a legislature to make
distinctions when creating legislation.1 06 Yet, the courts probe distinc-
tions of race and sex more closely than they probe other distinctions.1 07
The closer scrutiny of race and sex discrimination cases developed in
response to a history of subordination of blacks and women,10 8 not from
a general hostility to differentiations.
Nevertheless, the courts have sometimes lost sight of this primary
concern with anti-subordination when they have inquired into the lawful-
ness of race- or sex-based distinctions. As we have seen, the rules gov-
erning pleading of constitutional challenges to discriminatory laws reflect
a policy choice of anti-differentiation over anti-subordination.1 09 Under
existing constitutional equal protection doctrine, a plaintiff may not es-
tablish a prima facie case of discrimination solely with evidence that a
race- or sex-neutral policy or action had a disparate impact on a pro-
tected class of persons, but must instead offer proof of different treatment
or invidious motivation. Under statutory equal protection doctrine,
however, plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case either with evidence of
different treatment or solely with evidence of disparate impact."10 In the
statutory setting, therefore, the courts have permitted the plaintiff to es-
tablish a prima facie case through evidence that the institution violated
either the anti-differentiation principle or the anti-subordination
principle.
In this section, I question the construction of the prima facie case
under both the constitutional and statutory models. Like other commen-
106 See, e.g., Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (stating that chal-
lenged distinction "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation").
107 For example, while courts do not generally invalidate legislation that creates distinctions
in taxation based on a taxpayer's income, they do closely scrutinize legislation that creates
distinctions in taxation based on a taxpayer's race or sex. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351,
355, 356 n.10 (1974) (emphasizing leeway of states in enacting tax classifications).
108 See text accompanying notes 39-47, 76-90 supra; see also Chafe, The American Woman
(1972).
109 See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra.
110 See text accompanying notes 51-59 supra.
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tators,111 I criticize the courts for choosing the principle of anti-differen-
tiation over the principle of anti-subordination in the constitutional
cases. My criticism of the statutory cases, however, is novel. I argue
that the courts should not be satisfied with a showing that either the
principle of anti-differentiation or the principle of anti-subordination has
been violated. Rather, they should always insist on evidence that the
principle of anti-subordination has been violated. Evidence of different
treatment should not be sufficient.
Consideration of the following hypothetical situation will facilitate
an understanding of my argument:
A city agency has had a policy for the last five years that all pro-
fessional employees may have a month of paid sick leave each year and
the nonprofessional staff may have two weeks of paid sick leave. An
employee is not required to justify the use of this sick leave. However,
an employee who is absent more than the allotted sick leave may be
terminated.
The composition of this agency is: professional employees: 5%
black, 10% female; nonprofessional employees: 60% black, 90% fe-
male. Black women comprise 90% of the individuals who earn income
at the bottom two pay scales of this employer.
Over the last five years, the only employees to be terminated for
violating this policy were black women. These women missed work
for a variety of reasons, such as transportation, health, crime, housing
and child care problems.
Would (or should) black women be able to bring a successful
claim for violation of equal protection? If the employer or a court
recognized a problem at the workplace, would (or should) it be able to
order a race- and sex-specific leave policy to overcome this problem?
Anti-differentiation advocates would prefer to use a different treat-
ment analysis to describe the problem in this hypothetical and to develop
proper solutions to it. However, as I will show, that analysis cannot re-
solve the underlying problem. Instead, an effective response requires a
disparate impact analysis.
A. The Different Treatment Method of Proof
The different treatment approach requires black female plaintiffs to
show that the defendant is treating them differently than it is treating
similarly situated white or male workers. However, the black women in
the hypothetical could not use this approach to challenge the policy be-
cause there are no similarly situated white or male workers who are be-
ing treated differently. This understanding of inequality is deficient
because it permits the perpetuation of a system in which white men can
111 See authorities cited in note 12 supra.
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generally take more sick leave than black women because of their differ-
ing status within the workplace. 11 2 Hence, this understanding of inequal-
ity permits the perpetuation of the "horizontal" and "vertical"
segregation of the workplace. 1 3 Yet, a pure anti-differentiation analysis
would not even perceive that a violation of equal protection exists here.
If anti-differentiation proponents did perceive that a problem exists
here, they would insist that the employer respond only with race- and
sex-neutral policies. They argue that the different treatment approach is
important in defining discrimination and the scope of appropriate reme-
dies because it reduces the risk of perpetuating racial or sex-role stereo-
types. 114 They believe that facially differentiating policies perpetuate
112 See generally Omolade, Black Single Mothers: The Real Deal, 1987 Wis. Women's LJ.
(forthcoming 1987) (discussing economic and social inequities that have plagued black single
mothers).
113 See C. MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 9-13. "Horizontal" segregation describes how
working women are employed in jobs that are mostly performed by women. Id. at 10-11.
"Vertical" segregation describes how women are generally men's subordinates in the work-
place. Id. at 12-13. For further discussion of these inequities, see Krieger & Cooney, The
Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's
Equality, 13 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 513, 518-22 (1973). Krieger and Cooney argue that for
women to have equal employment opportunities, reasonable leave and job protection must be
granted to pregnant women. Since only women become pregnant, leave policies that draw no
distinctions between the sexes will have an adverse and disparate impact on women who must
take some time off from work as a result of pregnancy-related physical disability.
114 See, e.g., Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 2, at 329-30. Yet if the concern is sex-
role stereotypes, it is hard to see how one approach avoids the problem more than the other.
With respect to the issues of pregnancy leave policies, which Williams addresses, the success of
both approaches depends upon the ability to show that views about pregnant workers are not
stereotypical, that these workers do miss more work than other employees. The potential
stereotypes that might be reinforced under the anti-differentiation model become obvious if
one considers the merits of the legislation that Williams proposes to deal with the dispropor-
tionate impact that a no-leave policy can have against women workers. Williams endorses
legislation that would permit all workers to take leave to care for family members. See id. at
379. She considers such a statute preferable to a sex-specific statute that only requires leave for
pregnant workers, such as the California statute recently upheld in California Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987), because the former would not single out women
for "special treatment" in the workplace, and for primary responsibility in taking care of fam-
ily members. See Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 2, at 371, 377.
Nevertheless, this proposed statute would further other forms of traditional stereotyping.
For example, it assumes that it is more valid for persons to take care of family members than
to take care of other kinds of people. In doing so, it reinforces the societal benefits that go to
the traditional family unit. A gay man who might want to take leave from work to care for a
lover or friend who is suffering from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) would
not be covered. A member of an unmarried couple who has agreed to care jointly for a child,
but who is not legally one of the child's parents, would be unable to do so. Moreover, and
most important for sex-role stereotyping, it might place increased burdens on women to pro-
vide free care for family members because they no longer would be able to argue that their
employer would not give them leave time. Because women have historically had to shoulder
the burden of caring for children and elderly parents, there is no reason to believe that they
would not continue to share disproportionately in that burden under the anti-differentiation
proposal.
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racial and sex-role stereotypes by using race or sex as an inaccurate
proxy for sociological conditions that could be defined in race- and sex-
neutral terms.1 15 They therefore would not allow the employer to "cor-
rect" the disparate impact on black women through the use of a race- or
sex-specific policy. Assuming that their argument is correct, can we be
sure that their approach will avoid perpetuating stereotypes?1 16 More-
over, at what cost do we avoid perpetuating these stereotypes?
The cost of avoiding race- and sex-specific remedies is too high. A
race- and sex-specific remedy may be the most effective because it makes
it difficult for an uncooperative defendant to circumvent the court's or-
der.11 7 The history of court-ordered desegregation illustrates this point
strongly. After the Brown decision, many courts ordered desegregation
of public facilities, but many did not prescribe the way in which the de-
fendants should achieve desegregation. Some defendants responded by
closing the segregated public facility to avoid having to desegregate it. 118
Rather than recognize that race-specific remedies were necessary to in-
sure that these facilities would be open to blacks, the Supreme Court
avoided taking a strong position on this issue.1 1 9 The Court failed to
recognize that closing these facilities would have a disparate impact on
blacks who would not have access to the newly opened private facilities.
Similarly, in the hypothetical, if the court ordered the defendant to
provide the same leave to all workers to eliminate the impact of the two-
115 See Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 2, at 326.
116 See note 114 supra.
117 See United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1066 (1987) ("The [race-conscious] relief
at issue was imposed on a defendant with a consistent history of resistance to the District
Court's orders and only after the Department failed to live up to its court-approved commit-
ments." (emphasis in original)).
118 See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (public pool); Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435 (1970) (public park); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La.
1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961) (public schools).
119 In Bush, 365 U.S. at 569, the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion the district
court's invalidation of the state's action. The Bush case proved to have limited precedential
value outside the public education context, however, because ten years later, in Palmer, 403
U.S. at 217, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision permitting the defendants
to close a segregated public pool rather than desegregate it, id. at 227. In reaching its decision,
the majority rejected the dissent's position that the pool closing operated unequally on whites
and blacks. Id. at 220 n.5. The Court distinguished the Bush case as involving public educa-
tion, an especially important state function. Id. at 221 n.6. For further criticism of Palmer,
see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Highlights of the Term, 85
Harv. L. Rev. 40, 86-95 (1971); Note, Closing Pools To Avoid Desegregation: Treading Water,
58 Geo. L.J. 1220 (1970); Note, Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-Closing Municipal Swim-
ming Pools in Response to Desegregation Order Does Not Violate Negro Plaintiffs' Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendment Rights, 16 Wayne L. Rev. 1434 (1970). These commentators
generally criticize Palmer because it did not fully consider the evidence of invidious motive.
They do not discuss the issue of the limitations of race-neutral relief.
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tier leave policy on black women, the employer could respond with a no-
leave policy for all workers. Although this race- and sex-neutral policy
would meet the court's requirements, it would have an even greater dis-
parate impact on the black female workers, who would remain unable to
afford good health care, child care, or transportation. Thus, race- and
sex-neutral remedies may leave the underlying problem unresolved.
In addition, the anti-differentiation strategy may not always achieve
its intended results. The fact that a plaintiff has argued from an anti-
differentiation perspective does not mean that the courts will refrain
from imposing a race- or sex-specific remedy. In the hypothetical, even if
it were possible for a plaintiff to win a different treatment case and seek a
prospective race- and sex-neutral prospective remedy, the court would be
faced with many difficult choices. It could choose the plaintiff's pre-
ferred remedy of providing everyone with four weeks of leave time. This
remedy would be race- and sex-neutral. Or it could search for a middle
ground that would be reasonable in cost and tailored to remedy the un-
derlying problem. The court might search for a remedy that would de-
fine all the factors that are causing black women to miss work
disproportionately-housing, transportation, health care, child care, and
the like. However, it might decide that it is not feasible to define all these
factors in a way that would not lead to abuse of a new leave policy by
other workers. Hence, it might opt for a race- and sex-specific remedy
for black women. What will anti-differentiation proponents do at that
point? Might they argue for no remedy at all rather than a race- or sex-
specific remedy? No remedy at all would be an unfortunate development
after a court has found that discrimination exists. Thus, employment of
the different treatment approach does not necessarily avoid the possibil-
ity of race- or sex-specific policies or actions because the court may con-
clude that those are the best practical remedies. 120
The problem underlying these deficiencies in the different treatment
approach is the law's definition of "discrimination." A prima facie case
of discrimination can stand or fall solely on the basis of the language
used in expressing a rule. By creating a distinction between "women"
and "men," an employer is presumed to have discriminated on the basis
of sex. Conversely, by creating facially neutral classes such as "veterans"
and "nonveterans" rather than sex-specific distinctions like "men" and
"women," governmental entities are able to avoid a finding of
120 This observation has been validated recently in the context of attempts by the United
States Justice Department to prevent imposition of race- or sex-specific remedies in cases that
were brought by the United States during previous administrations. See, e.g., United States v.
City of Buffalo, 609 F. Supp. 1252 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (district court refused to remove existing
rae- and sex-specific goals and timetables in suit originally brought by Justice Department).




Prima facie discrimination need not be defined so superficially.
Under the present framework, the law allows rulemakers to hide an in-
vidious purpose behind facial neutrality. It would be more intellectually
honest, and useful, for rules to say what they mean, rather than be
drafted to meet the test of anti-differentiation. The real issue should be a
policy's contribution to, or redress of, subordination, not the way in
which it is phrased.
I therefore suggest that courts require some evidence of subordina-
tion in the presentation of the prima facie case.122 Evidence of differenti-
ation should not be sufficient. One kind of evidence that could
sufficiently establish subordination for the purpose of the prima facie case
is evidence of disparate impact. Such evidence would indicate that the
plaintiff is being treated differently because of her membership in a
group, suggesting that group-based inequality is present within that insti-
tution. By arguing that the courts require some evidence of subordina-
tion at the prima facie case stage, I am not suggesting that evidence of
differentiation is irrelevant to a showing of subordination or that courts
ignore the implications of remedial differentiation. Rather, I argue that
courts must specifically ask how differentiation influences subordination.
Differentiation may contribute to subordination, or it may redress it as in
the affirmative action setting. Courts should stop assuming, as anti-dif-
ferentiation proponents would have them assume, that differentiation can
only contribute to subordination and can never redress it.
In general, these criticisms reflect the failure of anti-differentiation
advocates to grasp fully both the practical and theoretical limitations of
the different treatment method of proof. This method of proof can
121 See Personnel Adm'rs of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
122 Professor MacKinnon has also recognized the necessity of establishing evidence of sub-
ordination in equal protection cases. In a conversation with me, she argued for an Equal
Rights Amendment that would make the subordination of women to men unconstitutional.
This amendment would shift the debate about equal protection to an inquiry into what prac-
tices are subordinating rather than simply differentiating. Under this approach, one might
argue that it is subordinating to women in the workplace to be subjected to the sexual advances
of male supervisors, because of men's power over women in the workplace, but not subordinat-
ing to men to have to respond to the sexual advances of female subordinates. See C. MacKin-
non, supra note 6, at 1-7.
In MacKinnon's words, the "inequality" or anti-subordination approach
understands the sexes to be not simply socially differentiated but socially unequal. In
this broader view, all practices which subordinate women to men are prohibited. The
differences approach, in its sensitivity to disparity and similarity, can be a useful correc-
tive to sexism; both women and men can be damaged by sexism, although usually it is
women who are. The inequality approach, by contrast, sees women's situation as a
structural problem of enforced inferiority that needs to be radically altered.
Id. at 4-5. This Article extends MacKinnon's observations to race cases and seeks to fit the
anti-subordination perspective within the analysis that occurs at the prima facie case stage.
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neither challenge structural barriers to equality adequately nor facilitate
the redress of group-based subordination. While the disparate impact
theory may be more successful, much of its success depends, as the dis-
cussion that follows will show, on the ability of its proponents to formu-
late and advance race- and sex-specific policies that truly redress
subordination.
B. Disparate Impact Method of Proof
The disparate impact approach would be more successful in combat-
ing the structural barriers to equality illustrated by the hypothetical. 123
It does not require proof of individualized discriminatory motivation and
would therefore permit consideration of a group-based claim by the black
female plaintiffs in the hypothetical. These plaintiffs could aggregate evi-
dence to show that the leave policy has a disparate impact on their em-
ployment opportunities within the workplace. Accordingly, they could
challenge some of the structural inequalities of the workplace exemplified
by the sick-leave policy. Finally, they could argue for race- or sex-spe-
cific prospective relief.
Despite these advantages, the existing use of the disparate impact
model in statutory litigation is too limited in two respects. First, the
statutory model permits courts to probe only the disparate impact of a
policy within an employer's workplace over a limited time period.
12 4
Thus, in the hypothetical, an employer would disclaim responsibility for
the factors causing black women to miss work and argue that it should
not bear the costs of remedying socially-imposed inequalities. If litigants
are to be successful in using law to remedy socially-imposed inequalities,
the concept of disparate impact must be broadened to include a societal
perspective.
Second, the disparate impact model, as currently employed, is only
available to the plaintiff to challenge the detrimental effects of a neutral
policy.125 The defendant cannot use its effects-oriented focus to argue for
the possible benefits of race- or sex-specific rules. For example, what if
the employer in the hypothetical noticed the disparate impact of its leave
policy on black women and wanted to solve this problem? The employer
would have to use a race- and sex-neutral approach, such as providing all
employees with four weeks of paid sick leave, in order to avoid a chal-
lenge by white male plaintiffs under the different treatment method of
proof. The employer would not be able to provide more sick leave only
to the employees adversely affected by the current policy, black women,
123 See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
124 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977).
125 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 61:1003
EQUAL PROTECTION
because such a policy would be race- and sex-specific. Under the model
proposed in this Article, defendants could use the disparate impact
method of proof to prove that a race- and sex-specific policy is not
discriminatory.
Of course, there are problems with an expanded disparate impact
approach. First, in the context of a traditional equal protection challenge
by a black or female plaintiff, it may not be fair to hold a defendant liable
for socially-created inequities. Second, in the affirmative action context,
institutions may needlessly choose race- and sex-specific remedies, and
run the risk of perpetuating racial and sex role stereotypes, when a race-
and sex-neutral remedy is available. For example, if the black women
were missing work only due to child care responsibilities, then it might
be best to use a remedy that would increase the leave available only for
these responsibilities. Nevertheless, not all persons with child care re-
sponsibilities might be equally deserving of increased leave; some of these
people may have enough financial resources to afford high quality child
care. Although a generic leave policy for persons with child care respon-
sibilities is preferable because it would avoid perpetuating race and sex
role stereotypes, such a policy might be overinclusive. Thus, institutions
need to consider carefully the advantages and disadvantages of race- and
sex-specific policies and actions before imposing them.
III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTI-DIFFERENTIATION
PRINCIPLE AT THE STAGE OF JUSTIFICATION
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendant has the burden of justifying the discrimination. At this stage,
commentators differ on whether the proffered justification should be as-
sessed from an anti-differentiation or anti-subordination perspective,
126
focusing most of their discussion on the affirmative action cases. Never-
theless, commentators have overlooked the fact that race and sex dis-
crimination models do not reflect the same choice between the anti-
differentiation and anti-subordination perspective. The sex discrimina-
tion model of intermediate scrutiny permits courts to consider a much
wider range of justifications for differentiations than does the race dis-
crimination model of strict scrutiny.1 27 Sometimes, courts use the flexi-
bility of intermediate scrutiny to permit sex-based policies to pass muster
126 Compare Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 2, at 325-28 (advocating anti-differen-
tiation perspective) with C. MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 4-5 (adopting anti-subordination
perspective); Krieger & Cooney, supra note 113, at 525-31 (same); Law, supra note 2, at 963
(same); Scales, supra note 2, at 430-31 (same).
127 Sea text accompanying notes 89-105 supra.
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when they redress subordination; other times, they use this flexibility to
accept less laudatory justifications. 128 Thus, sex-based intermediate scru-
tiny does not reflect a rigid anti-differentiation perspective and can ac-
comodate an anti-subordination perspective.
In contrast, courts reject virtually all justifications for race-based
policies under strict scrutiny. 129 Some members of the Court have there-
fore found it necessary to apply intermediate scrutiny to race-based af-
firmative action policies in order to justify validation of those policies;130
thus, race-based strict scrutiny has been too rigid to accomodate an anti-
subordination perspective. In this Part, I will argue that the price of the
courts taking race discrimination seriously, by adopting strict scrutiny
and an anti-differentiation model of justification, has been an inability to
consider the merits of using race-specific policies or actions to redress
racial subordination. The separate but corresponding price of courts tak-
ing sex discrimination less seriously under the anti-differentiation model
has been an inability to invalidate some invidious sex-based distinctions.
The first Section in this Part will examine these implications in greater
depth, first in the context of constitutional equal protection doctrine, and
then in the context of the equal protection statutes. To illustrate these
implications, the second Section will focus specifically on the education
area, where the effects of the different levels of scrutiny have been the
most obvious.
A. The Price of the Differing Levels of Scrutiny
Although Brown v. Board of Education 131 could be said to stand for
the proposition that it is equally invidious to exclude whites from
predominantly black educational institutions as to exclude blacks from
predominantly white educational institutions, the Court in Brown was
not faced with that issue. Instead, the Court was faced with the histori-
cal reality that blacks were receiving an inferior education, as well as the
ineffectiveness of remedying segregation on a case-by-case basis. 132 A
128 Compare Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding state property tax exemption
for widows because benefit was designed to ameliorate past economic discrimination against
women) with Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding federal law requiring that
only men register for the draft since only men were eligible for combat).
129 See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra. But see United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct.
1053 (1987); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063
(1986); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Union v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). These recent affirmative action cases suggest a loosening of
the traditional framework.
130 See Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); text accompanying
notes 134-38 infra.
131 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
132 See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra.
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strong statement was needed from the Supreme Court that would dra-
matically improve the educational benefits offered to blacks.
It was the history of subordination of blacks that moved the
Supreme Court to respond with its strict ruling that racially separate ed-
ucation cannot be equal education.133 Yet, the history in which Brown is
rooted further suggests that race-specific policies or actions should be
permitted to redress subordination. However, to uphold a justification of
anti-subordination for a race-specific policy or action against constitu-
tional challenge, some members of the Court have seen a need to lower
the level of scrutiny.
Justice Brennan has most consistently taken this approach. He has
developed an intermediate level of scrutiny to be used in the affirmative
action area that, in large part, encompasses the anti-subordination ap-
proach suggested in this Article. For example, in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, 34 Justice Brennan, joined by three other
justices, stated that in race discrimination cases brought by whites that
challenged race-specific policies and that did not involve fundamental
rights, he would use an intermediate level of scrutiny that posed the fol-
lowing two questions: (1) Did the race-specific policy reflect an "impor-
tant and articulated purpose," and (2) Did it "stigmatize[ ] any group or
single[ ] out those least well represented in the political process to bear
the brunt of a benign program"? 35 The first question is the traditional
question in intermediate scrutiny cases;136 the second question is not.
This second question squarely places the focus on an anti-subordination
justification by considering the impact on subordinated groups.
13 7
Rather than conclude that racial distinctions are inherently invidi-
ous, the Brennan group's opinion in Bakke acknowledged that racial dis-
tinctions may be able to redress subordination. They rejected a "color-
blind" approach to resolving affirmative action issues.138 Under this low-
133 See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
134 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
135 Id. at 361 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
136 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (asking whether the classification
serves "important governmental objectives and [is] substantially related to achievement of
those objectives").
137 This is not to suggest that Justice Brennan's position represents a perfect articulation of
the anti-subordination perspective. He does not evince the broad, societal view of subordina-
tion that I view as a necessary predicate to this perspective. In contrast, Justice Marshall holds
a stronger anti-subordination position. In his separate concurrence in Bakke, Justice Marshall
states, "It is unnecessary in 20th-century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate
that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so
pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact." 438
U.S. at 400.
138 They stated that the Court should not allow color-blindness to "become myopia which
masks the reality that many 'created equal' have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior
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ered level of scrutiny, the Brennan group would have accepted the spe-
cific plan used by the University of California. In contrast, under strict
scrutiny, Justice Powell could not accept the University's plan and sug-
gested that he could only accept an affirmative action plan phrased in
more race-neutral language, as in the "Harvard" plan.139
Thus, in Bakke, the difference in the levels of scrutiny employed by
Justices Powell and Brennan determined the outcome of the case. Justice
Powell's strict scrutiny was less tolerant of race-specific policies than Jus-
tice Brennan's intermediate scrutiny. Because only five of the members
of the Court reached the constitutional issue in Bakke, and only four
were in agreement, the case does not provide insight into what level of
scrutiny a majority of the Court would favor in the affirmative action
context. 140
The Court was most recently faced with the level of scrutiny issue in
United States v. Paradise141 and in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
both by the law and by their fellow citizens." Id. at 327 (Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Blackmun, in his separate concurrence, also challenged the color-blind view: "In
order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in
order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare
not-let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy." Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139 The Harvard plan considers race as one factor in a program to achieve more diversity.
Id. at 316-18 (Powell, J., concurring). Much of Justice Powell's description of strict scrutiny
fits into the pure anti-differentiation approach. For example, he stated that "[t]he guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else
when applied to a person of another color." Id. at 289-90. Moreover, he rejected the use of
the Carolene Products footnote focus on "discrete and insular minorities" in determining who
should be protected under strict scrutiny. He noted that these characteristics have "never been
invoked in our decisions as a prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to strict
scrutiny." Id. at 290. Most important, he insisted on an individual rights approach under
which discrimination against whites is taken as seriously as discrimination against blacks. See
id. at 291-99.
140 The post-Bakke cases have not reduced the confusion over the appropriate level of scru-
tiny. The Court next faced a constitutional challenge to affirmative action in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Justice Burger, writing for a plurality, accepted the ten per-
cent minority set-aside program as a limited and properly tailored remedy, but avoided the
issue of the appropriate level of scrutiny. Like Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the Court's
opinion in Fullilove suggested that strict scrutiny can accommodate some narrowly tailored
affirmative action.
There was also a separation of powers issue in Fulliove that emerged most clearly in
Justice Powell's concurrence. Justice Powell noted that it is appropriate for Congress, as the
national legislature, to address directly the problem of discrimination in our society. Id. at 499
(Powell, J., concurring). He viewed as more problematic the attempts by nonlegislative insti-
tutions to make such determinations, as the university had done in Bakke. Id. at 498. Thus,
we may be seeing a stricter level of scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment, when nonlegisla-
tive state actors are involved, than under the fifth amendment, when Congress's actions are
involved. For further discussion of the issues raised in Fullilove, see Days, Fullilove, 96 Yale
L.J. 453 (1987).
141 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1064 (1987).
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International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion.142 In each case, Justice Brennan wrote for the majority, upholding
district court orders of race-conscious relief for individuals who were not
identified victims of discrimination.1 43 But Justice Brennan avoided the
scrutiny issue in each of these cases by concluding that the respective
programs could withstand even the highest level of scrutiny.144 He was
able to avoid the scrutiny issue because of the egregious set of facts of
each case-a history of blatant racial discrimination within the defend-
ant's institution, a long record of resistance to official efforts to end the
discriminatory practices, and the limited and temporary impact of the
plan on white workers.145
On balance, it seems that Justice Brennan is heading toward a co-
herent articulation of the anti-subordination principle. 146 But his frame-
work leaves at least two problems unsettled. First, how does he know
whether to apply strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny? Would he rely
simply on whether the plaintiff is white in a race discrimination case or
whether the plaintiff is male in a sex discrimination case?147 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist has suggested that such a simplistic approach would be
appropriate in the sex discrimination context.
148
But differentiation based on the plaintiff's race or sex is not determi-
native of whether a policy or action is subordinating to blacks or women.
For example, if a bar offers half-price drinks to women in order to attract
142 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). Justice Brennan noted in Local 28 that "[w]e have consistently
recognized that governmental bodies constitutionally may adopt racial classifications as a rem-
edy for past discrimination.... We have not agreed, however, on the proper test to be applied
in analyzing the constitutionality of race-conscious remedial measures." Id. at 3052.
143 Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1064; Local 28, 106 S. Ct. at 3052.
144 See Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1064 ("We need not [reach consensus on the appropriate
constitutional analysis] ... in this case.... because we conclude that the relief ordered sur-
vives even strict scrutiny analysis .... ."); Local 28, 106 S. Ct. at 3053.
145 See Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1058-1064; Local 28, 106 S. Ct. at 3053; see also Local No. 93
v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 1063 (1986) (upholding race-conscious provision of consent
decree with city without expressly reaching constitutional issue).
146 Justice Marshall also continually expresses an anti-subordination perspective. See, e.g.,
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387 (Marshall, J.). Like Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall does not provide
guidance about how to determine whether to use strict scrutiny or some lesser standard in the
affirmative action context.
147 Although Bakke involved only a challenge of race discrimination, it seems that Justice
Brennan would use the same approach in sex discrimination cases, because he cites sex dis-
crimination cases as support for his use of lowered scrutiny in the affirmative action context.
See id. at 358-59 (acknowledging use of intermediate level of scrutiny in sex discrimination
cases where allegedly benign purpose exists).
148 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 219-21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (male plain-
tiff); see also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,476 (1981) (upholding statutory rape
statute providing penalties for males but not females). Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach
would presumably apply with equal force whenever the plaintiff is white in a race discrimina-
tion case.
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more male and female customers, 149 men might challenge the policy as
discriminatory on the basis of sex, since they cannot take advantage of
the offer. Under Rehnquist's approach, the case would be subjected to
lowered scrutiny because the plaintiffs are men. However, such a prac-
tice directly reinforces sex-role stereotypes about women and perpetuates
women's subordination. 150 While the Brennan model tries to engage in a
more probing analysis than simply asking the identity of the plaintiff, the
model has dangerous implications in Chief Justice Rehnquist's hands.
Second, lowering the level of scrutiny in any subcategory of cases
involving race discrimination might permit justifications other than re-
dressing subordination,1 5 1 as has occurred in the cases treating sex-dis-
crimination. 152 Like race-based equal protection doctrine, sex-based
equal protection doctrine has developed through the efforts of plaintiffs
challenging subordination. For women, unlike blacks, this task was
complicated by the need to attack "special protection" legislation that
created sex-specific rules purportedly to assist women but that, in fact,
helped to perpetuate paternalistic stereotypes about them. 153 Thus, op-
ponents of sex discrimination have often attacked the propriety of sex-
specific rules in an attempt to eradicate the subordination that stems
from paternalistic "special" protection.1 54
The Supreme Court has not responded to these sex discrimination
149 See Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md. App. 39, 506 A.2d 263 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986) (successfully challenging half-price drink policy, first for "ladies" and then for
persons wearing "skirts and gowns").
150 The half-price drink policy demeans women by suggesting that their role is to be sexu-
ally available to men. It further supports the social stereotype that women should not be
expected to pay for their own meals or beverages to the same extent as men. See generally, A.
Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women 19-24 (1981) (discussing how men use money
and sex to dominate women); C. MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 155-57 (discussing sex-role
sterotypes).
151 For example, Justice Douglas asserted that regulations based on race may be justified
when a special trait or disease affects a particular group. Under this rationale, he viewed
regulations banning the sale of liquor to North American Indians and Eskimos as permissible
because of the devastating effect liquor has on these groups. See W. Douglas, We the Judges
399 (1956); see also Debbs, Constitutional and Practical Considerations in Mandatory Sickle
Cell Anemia Testing, 7 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 507, 518-20 (1974) (arguing that mandatory testing
for sickle cell anemia is not unconstitutional and will not lead to state restrictions on rights of
blacks to marry and reproduce).
152 See text accompanying notes 76-97 supra and 155-182 infra.
153 For examples of such legislation, see Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding
state statute that forbade women from becoming bartenders unless their husband or father was
a bartender); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (sustaining Oregon law that provided that
"no female" shall be employed in any factory or laundry "more than ten hours during any one
day"). The Goesaert Court, applying the classic rational basis scrutiny, did not seek to deter-
mine the legislature's actual reasons for the legislation. The evidence in the record suggested
that the real reason that women were denied the opportunity was to maintain the male monop-
oly on bartending. See Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466.
154 See Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 2, at 334-35.
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arguments consistently. Because it sometimes permits sex-specific poli-
cies or actions to withstand scrutiny, 155 the Court does not appear to
have a pure anti-differentiation perspective in this area. Instead, the
Court has waffled in response to plaintiffs' arguments against returning
to a history of paternalistic subordination. While modern sex-based
equal protection cases emerged from the belief that women have faced a
history of subordination that must be redressed, 156 the decisions in Reed
v. Reed 157 and its progeny have made it clear that the subordination of
women is not the only justification that can survive intermediate
scrutiny.
The genesis of this problem can be found in Kahn v. Shevin 1 58 In its
final footnote, the Kahn majority provided the first direct link between
the level of scrutiny and the consideration of justifications for sex-specific
policies or actions.1 59 Justifying its acceptance of the state's purported
argument for passing a tax statute favoring women, the Court rejected
the necessity of determining the state's real motivation for passing the
statute because
[g]ender has never been rejected as an impermissible classification in
all instances. Congress has not so far drafted women in the Armed
Services. The famous Brandeis Brief in Muller v. Oregon, on which the
Court specifically relied, emphasized that the special physical structure
of women has a bearing on the "conditions under which she should be
permitted to toil." 16"
Hence, Kahn v. Shevin shows that the development of intermediate scru-
tiny, which served to accommodate the principle of anti-subordination at
the stage of justification, ironically also opened the door to affirmance of
subordinating rationales for sex-specific policies. The Court in Kahn
cited Muller v. Oregon 161 with approval to justify upholding a sex-spe-
cific rule under a lowered level of scrutiny, even though the ruling in
Muller had contributed to the subordination of women by upholding ex-
tremely paternalistic limitations on the hours women could work.1 62 The
155 See text accompanying notes 76-97 supra.
156 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
157 404 U.S. 71 (1971). For a discussion of Reed and its progeny, see text accompanying
notes 83-97 supra.
158 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
159 See id. at 356 n.10.
160 Id. (citations omitted).
161 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
162 The Muller Court had justifed the legislation with the following statement:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at
a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the
burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony
of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this
from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are
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Muller Court had accepted the argument that women were the weaker
sex and needed to be protected from long working hours in order to safe-
guard their reproductive capacities. 163 Continued acceptance of the
Muller rationale was too high a price to pay for intermediate scrutiny,
even though such a lowered level of scrutiny allows consideration of anti-
subordination justifications for sex-specific rules.
If not for the footnote reference to Muller, one could easily argue
that Kahn was a case that used the lowered-scrutiny model solely for the
purpose of considering the principle of anti-subordination in a situation
where few negative implications existed. The property tax exemption
had little chance of furthering sexual stereotypes because it was not
widely known by the public. 164 Moreover, nothing in the text of the ma-
jority opinion relied on outdated stereotypes of women for justification.
Instead, the Court focused on widely accepted empirical evidence. 165
The negative implication of Kahn, however, was the death knell for pure
strict scrutiny. Since Kahn, the Court has repeatedly used intermediate
scrutiny to consider justifications other than the eradication of
subordination.16
6
Under the Court's logic in these cases, regulations containing dis-
tinctions that are based on accurate empirical data can also survive inter-
mediate scrutiny so long as those regulations serve an important
governmental function or objective. In Craig v. Boren,167 for example,
the state articulated the important objective of traffic safety in setting
different drinking ages for males and females. 168 The Court, however,
struck down the statute because it concluded that the evidence did not
demonstrate that sex was an accurate proxy for the regulation of drink-
ing and driving.169 If the empirical evidence had been stronger, the
Court might have upheld the state's sex-specific policy even though it
would not have furthered the principle of anti-subordination.
essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of
public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
Id. at 421.
163 See id.
164 In fact, many widows were not even aware of the rule. A widow had to apply for the
exemption in order to avail herself of it. Kahn, 416 U.S. at 359 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 353 & nn.4-6 (opinion of Court).
166 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding sex-specific
statutory rape statute). For cases in which the Court considered, but ultimately rejected such
justifications, see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (invalidating
women-only admission policy of state supported university); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (invalidating state law barring sale of beer to males under age 21 and females under age
18).
167 429 U.S. 190 (1970).
168 Id. at 199.
169 See id. at 199-202 & 199 n.7.
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The Craig analysis has dangerous implications because it suggests
that empirical evidence of socially created differences can justify sex-spe-
cific statutes, irrespective of whether these statutes seek to overcome a
history of subordination. For example, in Reed v. Reed,170 if the state
had offered evidence that men, on average, had more experience and edu-
cation in business matters, it is possible that the state's irrebuttable pre-
sumption for men as estate administrators would have survived. Clearly,
such a statutory presumption would both further negative stereotypes
about women and exacerbate women's inability to gain experience in eco-
nomic matters, thereby contributing to women's subordination. Empiri-
cal evidence, no matter how strong, should not be allowed to further
subordination. But the analysis in Craig suggests that it can.
171
The fruits of Reed and Craig can be seen in the most troubling re-
cent sex discrimination case decided under intermediate scrutiny,
Michael M. v. Superior Court.1 72 The petitioner in Michael M. chal-
lenged the constitutionality of California's statutory rape law, under
which it was illegal to have sexual intercourse with a female under the
age of eighteen but not illegal to have sexual intercourse with a male
under the age of eighteen.173 The seventeen-and-a-half year old male
plaintiff, Michael M., had been convicted of statutory rape when he had
sexual relations with a sixteen-and-a-half-year-old female, Sharon.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, assumed that the state
statute discriminated against men because it made "men alone criminally
liable for the act of sexual intercourse."1 74 Relying on Reed and Craig,
170 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
171 Under the framework proposed by this Article, see text accompanying notes 252-56
infra, the Craig Court would have struck down the state statute more easily. At the prima
facie case stage, the Court would have seen that the beer purchasing rule produced a disparate
impact on males. At the justification stage, the Court would have readily seen that the policy
in no way served to eliminate the subordination of women. Preventing drunk driving, the
state's proposed justification, is an admirable goal, but it is entirely unrelated to eliminating
sexual subordination. Indeed, the statute furthered sexual stereotyping by reinforcing the no-
tion that only teenage boys, not teenage girls, drink and drive. Although the result in Craig
would remain the same, analysis of the case in this manner would remove the implicit message
Craig sent to the states, namely, that similar statutes might pass constitutional muster if better
supported by empirical evidence. Under the proposed framework, Craig would instead stand
for the rule that empirical evidence unrelated to the position of women in society is irrelevant
in justifying such a statute.
172 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
173 Section 261.5 of the California Penal Code defined unlawful sexual intercourse as "an
act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the
female is under the age of 18 years." Id. at 466 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 261.5 (West Supp.
1981)).
174 Id. Justice Rehnquist's statement seems to be premised on the assumption that a female
could not be prosecuted for statutory rape if she had sex with another female who was under
the age of 18. If the state would prosecute such an action under the statutory rape statute,
then a woman could be held criminally liable for having sexual relations with another woman.
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Justice Rehnquist applied intermediate scrutiny to the case, asking
whether the gender-based classification had a fair and substantial rela-
tionship to legitimate state ends or important goverment objectives.
17"
He concluded that the statute served the strong state interest in prevent-
ing illegitimate pregnancy. 176 In addition, he concluded that because all
of the significant harmful and inescapable identifiable consequences of
teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, the legislature had acted
within its authority in electing only to punish the participant who, by
nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct.
177
Although the Court purported to ask how this legislation affected
women, it did not do so from an anti-subordination perspective. For ex-
ample, Justice Rehnquist did not consider whether Sharon desired state
protection or found the sexual intercourse objectionable. He recognized
that "this is not a case where a statute is being challenged on the grounds
that it 'individiously discriminated' against females."1 78 But he never ex-
amined the statute's significance to women. From an anti-subordination
perspective, that issue should have been the heart of the inquiry.
Justice Rehnquist avoided that issue by asserting that the statute
was "an attempt by a legislature to prevent illegitimate teenage preg-
nancy." 179 The paucity of evidence before the Court, however, strongly
suggested that the desire to control pregnancy was, at best, a post hoc
rationalization.1 80 Moreover, that rationalization did not even fit with
the provisions of the statute because the statute also made sexual inter-
course with prepubescent females unlawful. The interest in limiting teen-
age pregnancy seemed to be as much a reflection of the state's interests in
protecting its financial resources as in protecting the interests of
women. 181
Justice Rehnquist's statement would therefore be more accurate if he said that the state could
only prosecute individuals who had sexual intercourse with an underage female but not indi-
viduals who had sexual intercourse with an underage male.
175 Id. at 468-69.
176 See id.
177 See id. at 473.
178 Id. at 475.
179 Id.
180 As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, "even assuming that prevention of pregnancy is
an important governmental objective and that it is in fact an objective of [the statute]... the
state must produce evidence that will persuade the court that its assertion is true." Id. at 491-
92 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since the state did not produce such evidence, Justice Brennan
argued the state had failed to show that its sex-based statute was substantially related to the
supposed goal of reducing the rate of teenage pregnancies. Id. at 492-93. In any event, it is
especially difficult to take Justice Rehnquist seriously in his assertion of the need to protect
women from unwanted pregnancy, given his views on the abortion issue. See Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2192-2216 (Rehnquist,
J., joining White, J., dissenting).
181 This concern about the state's financial resources is suggested in the following statement:
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The use of intermediate scrutiny enabled Justice Rehnquist to bring
in considerations unrelated to elimination of women's subordination in
order to uphold a sex-based statute. Under the sloppy framework of in-
termediate scrutiny, he was able to allow such a statute to pass muster,
although it is doubtful that an analogous race-based statute could have
passed muster under strict scrutiny. 18 2
B. The Flexibility of The Statutory Framework
The discussion thus far in this Part has concerned itself solely with
constitutional doctrine that has evolved out of challenges to race- and
sex-based discrimination brought under the equal protection clause. A
somewhat different set of doctrinal developments has evolved from cases
brought under the civil rights statutes.
In statutory cases, the courts use a framework that is generally more
tolerant of race- or sex-specific policies or actions at the justification
stage. 183 This tolerance can be problematic. Most significant, the courts'
interpretation of the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception to
"At the risk of stating the obvious, teenage pregnancies, which have increased dramatically
over the last two decades, have significant social, medical, and economic consequences for both
the mother and her child, and the State." Michael M., 450 U.S. at 470 (emphasis added).
182 The best race-based analogy is Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In that case, the
Supreme Court overturned a state statute that made it unlawful for white people to marry
people of color. Although racial purity was the obvious goal of the statute, the state's rationale
could have been seen as the prevention of unwanted births of mixed-race children, yet the
Court was unwilling to consider the merits of that justification.
183 See Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-
Alternative Approach, 84 Yale L.J. 98 (1974). A greater tolerance of race- or sex-based effects
in the statutory context can also be seen under the disparate impact model. If the plaintiff
establishes a disparate impact case, the defendant can prevail with a showing of "business
necessity." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). This justification does not
reflect consideration of the principle of anti-subordination but, rather, reflects a concern for the
convenience of the employer, although the allowance of this justification could perhaps be seen
as a pragmatic corollary to the lowered threshold for making out a prima facie case under the
disparate impact model. Nonetheless, this defense serves to perpetuate, rather than eradicate,
the subordination of minorities and women.
The courts have, however, interpreted the business necessity test quite narrowly in dispa-
rate impact race cases. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). In its widely-followed formulation in Robinson, the
Fourth Circuit explained the standard.
[T]he applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for adhering
to a challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate busi-
ness purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any
racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it
is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or prac-
tices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it
equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Title VIII8 4 has served to promote, for example, stereotypes about wo-
men's vulnerability to rape185 or need for privacy. 186 Similarly, educa-
tional discrimination claims can be defended with arguments about the
importance of beauty pageants, single-sex housing, or single-sex educa-
tion in undergraduate institutions.187 Thus, while exceptions to the prin-
ciple of anti-differentiation exist in the sex-based statutory model, few of
these exceptions help redress subordination, 188 and some exceptions
serve to exacerbate the subordination of women. 189
But the advantage of this greater tolerance in the statutory context
is that it has allowed the courts to permit arguments for anti-subordina-
tion to justify race- or sex-specific policies. It is clear that if a defendant
is willing to admit a prior history of discrimination at its institution, it
may be permitted to engage in race-conscious affirmative action. 19° The
184 See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
185 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) (upholding exclusion of women
from prison guard positions because a "woman's relative ability to maintain order in a male,
maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary . . . could be directly reduced by her
womanhood").
186 See, e.g., Fesel v. Masonic Home, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd mem.,
591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). The BFOQ requirement has also been used to uphold a
mandatory grounding policy for pregnant flight attendants. See Condit v. United Air Lines,
558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978).
187 See text accompanying note 104 supra (discussing sex-based exceptions to Title IX).
188 One statutory exception to the principle of anti-differentiation that may help to redress
women's subordination was recently explored in California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
107 S. Ct. 683 (1987). In Guerra, the Supreme Court held that the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1980) [hereinafter PDA], did not preempt a California
statute that required employers to provide female employees an unpaid pregnancy disability
leave of up to four months. Pregnant workers had an unqualified right to reinstatement after
taking such a disability leave, irrespective of whether the employer allowed leave for other
forms of disabilities. The PDA specifies that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy in determining whether an employer has violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1982). Thus, the issue posed by the case was
whether compliance with the California statute would constitute violation of the PDA, since
nonpregnant workers were not entitled to disability leave whereas pregnant workers were. See
Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 686. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, analyzed the legislative
history of the PDA and concluded that its purpose was to improve the employment opportuni-
ties of women. Id. at 693-94. He therefore rejected a rigid anti-differentiation view and upheld
the state statute as consistent with an anti-subordination purpose of improving women's em-
ployment opportunities. See id. at 695. Because Guerra was limited to a narrow issue of the
construction of the PDA, it is hard to discern how portable its reasoning will be to future
interpretations of Title VII.
189 For example, beauty pageants, where sex-role stereoptyping is explicitly rewarded, are
exempt from Title IX. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a)(9)
(1982).
190 See Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3072-
73 (1986); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979). The constitutional equal pro-
tection analysis also seems receptive to this kind of proof, according to the Court's recent
decision in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1848 (1986) ("In particular, a
public employer... must ensure that, before it embarks on an affirmative action program, it
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Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson v. Transportation Agency 191
extends this principle to sex-specific affirmative actions plans192 and sug-
gests that the evidence of discrimination need not be confined to the de-
fendant's institution. 93 The Court emphasized that employers have a
"relatively large domain for voluntary employer action;"1 94 they are not
limited to the actions that courts can order as remedies. Johnson, there-
fore, appears to stand for the proposition that employers may choose to
create race- or sex-conscious affirmative action programs to redress sub-
ordination, although Title VII does not require them to take such
steps. 195 Because the Court in Johnson carefully distinguished between
what an employer may do voluntarily and what a court can impose as a
remedy, 196 Johnson does not suggest that courts can try to remedy gener-
alized, societal evidence of discrimination through race- or sex-specific
programs.
197
The Johnson decision may say more about the limits of the court's
political power than about the principles of anti-differentiation and anti-
subordination underlying Title VII or the equal protection clause. The
Johnson Court seemed to recognize that race- and sex-based affirmative
action plans may be the only way to remedy societal discrimination and
that such plans are consistent with the underlying policy of Title VII.198
However, the Court is uncomfortable with imposing those plans coer-
cively. It would prefer for employers to choose voluntarily to remedy
societal discrimination. Thus, the Johnson compromise (i.e., giving em-
ployers more power to impose sex-specific remedies than the courts) may
be seen as another chapter in the Court's pragmatic resolution of the
difficulties in achieving equality 99 rather than as a choice between anti-
has convincing evidence that remedial action is warranted. That is, it must have sufficient
evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination.").
191 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
192 See id. at 1452-53, 1457.
193 In Johnson, the Court focused on whether there was a "manifest imbalance" between the
percentage of women in the employer's work force and the percentage of women in the area
labor market or general population. See id. at 1452-53.
194 Id. at 1452 n.8.
195 See id. at 1457 ("Such a plan is fully consistent with Title VII, for it embodies the
contribution that voluntary employer action can make in eliminating the vestiges of discrimi-
nation in the workplace.").
196 See id. at 1452 n.8.
197 The Court's decision in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986), made it
clear that it is impermissible to consider general evidence of societal discrimination. Justice
Powell stated: "This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to
justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior dis-
crimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifica-
tions in order to remedy such discrimination." Id. at 1847.
198 See Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1457.
199 See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
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differentiation and anti-subordination. Although the Court recognizes
that the dominant principle underlying nondiscrimination is anti-subor-
dination,200 it also recognizes that there may be pragmatic limitations to
enforcement of that principle.
In sum, then, the Court's experimentation with varying levels of
scrutiny of race- and sex-specific policies, in both the constitutional and
statutory settings, has had both positive and negative implications for the
effort to bring forth an anti-subordination approach to equal protection.
The greater tolerance of sex-specific policies has led to the positive result
that policies and laws that differentiate for the purpose of eliminating
subordination pass muster, but also to the negative result that sex-specific
policies or actions serving less important, often invidious, purposes also
survive. By contrast, the lesser tolerance of race-specific policies under
strict scrutiny has led to the positive result that virtually no race-specific
policy can pass muster, but has also led to a rather awkward attempt to
accommodate race-specific remedies ordered for the purpose of re-
dressing a particularly egregious case of subordination.
20'
Commentators have largely overlooked these important implica-
tions.202 One reason for this failure may be that most commentators do
not compare race and sex discrimination doctrine, but rather work in one
area.203 I have therefore attempted to bring these two areas together to
200 In Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986), for
example, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the principle of anti-subordination
in its quotation of the following passage from Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979):
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial
injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had "been excluded from the
American dream for so long" constituted the first voluntary, private, race-conscious ef-
forts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.
Local No. 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3072-73 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 204 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec.
6552 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey))); see also Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1450 (quoting
same passage).
201 See United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
202 See articles cited in notes 2, 4, 6-7, 9-13, 15-17 supra. For examples of race and sex
comparisons from perspectives compatible with this Article's view, see Perry, Modem Equal
Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1050-56 (1979);
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 1710-13 (1984).
203 There is, however, an emerging group of scholars who write about black women. See,
e.g., All the Women are White, All the Blacks are Men, But Some of Us are Brave (G. Hull, P.
Scott & B. Smith eds. 1982) (examining society's treatment of black women); Home Girls: A
Black Feminist Anthology (B. Smith ed. 1983); Getman, Sexual Control in the Slaveholding
South: The Implementation and Maintenance of a Racial Caste System, 7 Harv. Women's LJ.
115 (1984) (examining impact of racial caste system among black women under slavery); Omo-
lade, supra note 112; Wriggins, Rape, Racism & the Law, 6 Harv. Women's L.J. 103 (1983)
(tracing racism inherent in society's treatment of rape issues). The primary goal of this schol-
arship is to develop a view of race and sex discrimination that can account for the experience
of black women, without describing that experience as simply the combination of race and sex
discrimination. Such an approach has received some acceptance within law. See, e.g., Jeffries
v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-35 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding
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make clear that the consideration of anti-subordination justifications has
not been without a stiff price.
C A Case Study: Education
Developments in the education area of equal protection jurispru-
dence most clearly illustrate that intermediate scrutiny resulted from the
consideration of justifications for sex-specific policies or actions. The
trade-off has been most evident in cases challenging the existence of sin-
gle race and single sex colleges. While intermediate scrutiny has permit-
ted justifications for all-women's colleges in the sex discrimination
context,2°4 all-black colleges or predominantly black faculties at black
colleges have not been accorded the same latitude because of the strict
scrutiny applied to racial differentiation.20 5 Similarly, while strict scru-
tiny has permitted strong efforts to desegregate white institutions, 20 6 in-
termediate scrutiny has made it difficult to require integration of single
sex institutions.20 7 This section will examine each of these phenomena in
turn.
1. Black Colleges
The desegregation of both white and black colleges has been an im-
portant chapter in the history of racial desegregation.208 In the 1960s,
many black educators became concerned with the tendency of states to
build new white colleges or develop existing ones while ignoring
predominantly black institutions located nearby.209 Fearing that deseg-
regation would threaten the future of black institutions, they argued that
black schools should be permitted to retain their identity while allowing
that black woman's claim of race and sex discrimination in employment could survive motion
for summary judgment even if she could not articulate separate allegations of race or sex dis-
crimination). However, this special synthetic view has received virtually no attention within
mainstream legal scholarship.
204 See text accompanying notes 227-48 infra.
205 See text accompanying notes 218-26 infra.
206 See text acccompanying notes 68-75 supra.
207 See text accompanying notes 227-48 infra.
208 For an excellent discussion of this history, see Shades of Brown, supra note 15; see also
Kluger, supra note 60.
209 Nevertheless, the arguments of black educators have been largely ignored. For example,
according to Professor Bell, minority scholarship was entirely ignored during the Bakke litiga-
tion. Bell, Bakke, supra note 5, at 3-4. The only law review articles cited in the Supreme
Court opinions in Bakke were written by whites. Id. For a list of articles by minority scholars
that the Court failed to cite, see id. at 4 n.2. For a more recent discussion of the discourage-
ment of minority writing in the area of racism, and of the absence of attention to the minority
work that does exist, see Delgado, Commentary, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Re-
view of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984); Delgado, The Author Replies,
3 Law & Inequality 261 (1985).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
December 1986]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
admissions of whites on a nondiscriminatory basis.210 They further ad-
vocated that such institutions be given both adequate budgets and the
primary responsibility for aspects of education of particular interest to
the black community, such as social welfare, community planning, and
community public health.21" Most important, they urged that black col-
leges not be consigned to oblivion through abandonment or consolidation
just at the period when their services were most needed in the black
community. 21
2
Nevertheless, Brown was viewed as having resolved the unconstitu-
tionality of any system, however voluntary, that maintained predomi-
nantly black institutions.213 The issue of what steps predominantly white
institutions could take to admit blacks preferentially, in order to achieve
racial integration, remained unresolved for many years.
Though many educators and civil fights groups argued that
predominantly white colleges should be able to have special admissions
programs to recruit and admit minority applicants in order to remedy a
history of past discrimination, the Supreme Court held, in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,214 that such a program could not rely
exclusively on race-specific criteria.215 Writing to express the Court's
judgment, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke probed the difference be-
tween strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny. He determined that he
could not apply intermediate scrutiny to the preferential classifications,
precisely because intermediate scrutiny represents a less serious attitude
toward discrimination than strict scrutiny.216 His argument implicitly
suggested that preferential treatment could only be upheld under inter-
mediate scrutiny and that that level of scrutiny was inappropriate in the
racial context:
210 Goodwin, Southern State Governments and Higher Education for Negroes, 100 Daeda-
lis 783, 787-88 (1971); Harper, The Legal Status of Black Colleges, 100 Daedalus 772, 777-78
(1971); see also Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board of Education, in Shades of Brown,
supra note 15, at 21-28 (emphasizing that focus of Brown was equal educational opportunity
rather than integration); Lightfoot, Families as Educators: The Forgotten People of Brown, in
Shades of Brown, supra note 15, at 3-19 (arguing that desegregation has been overemphasized
in terms of its impact on improving education of blacks); Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of
Meanings, in Shades of Brown, supra note 15, at 31-47 (arguing that desegregation should
mean removal of all barriers based on race but not dismantling of autonomous black
institutions).
211 Goodwin, supra note 210, at 787-88.
212 Harper, supra note 210, at 777.
213 See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435-38 (1968).
214 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
215 Id. at 320 (Powell, J., concurring). Five Justices agreed, however, that the Davis medi-
cal school could take race into account as part of a larger program with numerous other neu-
tral criteria for determining admissions. See id. at 322 (Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
216 See id. at 302-03.
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Gender-based distinctions are less likely to create the analytical and
practical problems present in preferential programs premised on racial
or ethnic criteria.... The resolution of these same questions in the
context of racial and ethnic preferences presents far more complex and
intractable problems than gender-based classifications. More impor-
tantly, the perception of racial classifications as inherently odious
stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based classifica-
tions do not share. In sum, the Court has never viewed such classifica-
tions as inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or ethnic
classifications for the purpose of equal protection analysis.
217
Thus, current strict scrutiny analysis does not allow an interest in
diversity in admissions to justify a purely race-conscious admissions pro-
gram. This Article argues that the principle of anti-subordination should
be incorporated into the strict scrutiny framework so that such a pro-
gram could be upheld without lowering the level of scrutiny. Were bona-
fide justifications based on the principle of anti-subordination allowed
under strict scrutiny review, affirmative action programs that were care-
fully designed to redress a prior history of subordination could withstand
equal protection challenges.
Moreover, black colleges could maintain preferential admissions
plans as well, providing they could demonstrate a need within the black
community for such institutions. Although Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion 21 8 rested on the premise that black students receive virtually no ben-
efits from being educated in an all-black environment with only black
children, the Brown court was reacting to a history of segregation forced
upon the black minority by the white majority. The Court did not con-
template the inherent qualitative difference in an institutional environ-
ment that became predominantly black by choice. Strict scrutiny should
tolerate such programs where a clear anti-subordination justification is
articulated and substantiated. Such scrutiny should extend to faculty
employment issues as well. Minority students, as well as white students,
benefit, in terms of heightened self-esteem and broadened world views,
217 Id. In contrast to Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), where the Court upheld a
property tax exemption for women, the Court in Bakke refused to use general population
statistics about racial educational opportunities to justify the program. Instead, it insisted that
the state would have to demonstrate that the "classification is responsive to identified discrimi-
nation." 438 U.S. at 309.
Nevertheless, the University was able to argue successfully for the right to select a diverse
student body, as protected by the first amendment. Balancing first amendment and fourteenth
amendment interests, the Court stated: "The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's special admissions program, fo-
cused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diver-
sity." Id. at 315.
218 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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from having minority role models on the faculties and administrative
staffs of their schools. Yet, under strict scrutiny analysis, the courts have
not been able to consider the potential benefits of predominantly black
colleges or black faculties. In the last ten years, there have been four
cases involving hiring at black colleges.219 In not one of these cases did
the courts attempt to justify the unequal treatment of whites by consider-
ing the special status of black colleges in the educational process. In-
stead, the courts used strong language to express their unwillingness to
consider the special posture of these schools. For example, in Craig v.
Alabama State University220 the defendant had argued that it was justi-
fied in treating blacks preferentially in hiring because blacks had virtually
no employment alternatives in the institutions of higher education else-
where in the state.221 The defendant presented strong statistical data that
blacks comprised less than one percent of the administrative staff or
faculty of other institutions in the state.222 Nonetheless, the court re-
jected these facts as a justification for discrimination against whites.
It was precisely this type of argument which individual white universi-
ties used to attempt to defend themselves against desegregation efforts
in the early days after Brown v. Board of Education. When brought to
court to answer for their discriminatory practices, these schools would
argue that if other universities could discriminate, so could they. The
answer to this contention is the same now as it was then. A party
guilty of discrimination can receive no solace or support from the fact
that others have acted contrary to law.
22 3
219 See Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980); Fisher v. Dillard
Univ., 499 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. La. 1980); Craig v. Alabama State Univ., 451 F. Supp. 1207
(M.D. Ala. 1978), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1980); Planells v. Howard Univ., 32 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 336, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,089 (D.D.C. 1983).
220 451 F. Supp. 1207 (M.D. Ala. 1978), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1980). A civil rights
class action had been brought against the University alleging that it had engaged in a pattern
and practice of discrimination against whites in its employment practices. The action was
brought under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (1982), thus both constitutional and statutory issues were presented.
The court began its analysis with the assertion that "the Constitution and the civil rights
statutes pursuant to which this suit is brought outlaw affirmative discrimination against whites
as well as against members of racial minorities." 451 F. Supp. at 1208. It then proceeded to
analyze the case exactly as it would have analyzed an employment discrimination case brought
by a black against a predominantly white institution, and found that the institution had unlaw-
fully discriminated. See id.
221 Id. at 1214.
222 See id.
223 Id. Two years later, the Fifth Circuit followed this approach in a case successfully
brought by a white plaintiff against a predominantly black school. Whiting, 616 F.2d at 116.
Similarly, in Fisher, 499 F. Supp. at 525, the district court found that a white woman suffered
racial discrimination at a predominantly black institution, and held that she satisfied the first
step of the prima facie case "because she is white, she was employed by a predominantly black
institution, and race is an impermissible employment consideration." Id. at 530. Indeed, the
fact that the institution was predominantly black assisted the plaintiff in asserting her case.
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Similarly, in 1983, Howard University argued in defense of its pref-
erential treatment of a black applicant that as a historically black institu-
tion of higher education, it should be subject to lesser scrutiny. 224 The
court rejected this argument.
Howard University's novel defense to this Title VII action violates
the very spirit of racial equality which has animated the civil rights
movement since the historical Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Board of Education. Defendant's suggestion that black institutions are
free to give preference to blacks in faculty recruitment and promotion
marks it, in this Court's view, as an apostate to the cause of racial
equality. Ironically, many eminent leaders in the civil rights move-
ment of the past half-century emanated from the halls of the Howard
University, which now asks this Court to abandon the "colorblind"
policies for which those leaders fought.
Nor can Howard University's discriminatory actions be defended
on the ground that black colleges "are not required to integrate the
teaching staff in such a fashion that teaching opportunities for Blacks
in the total [academic] work force should be diminished." Although
we are aware that blacks represent a small proportion of the Ph.D.'s in
the United States today, perhaps as little as three percent, employment
opportunities for black academics are likely to be good relative to their
white counterparts precisely because of their small number and be-
cause major universities are consciously seeking to increase the repre-
sentation of blacks and other minorities on their faculties.
Therefore, defendant's novel defense theory is no more than a
weak post hoc rationalization for a racial preference which clearly vio-
lates federal civil rights laws and the spirit of racial equality.
225
The court thus refused to consider the anti-subordination argument,
holding instead that the principle of anti-differentiation always overrides
the principle of anti-subordination in race cases.
Every court that has considered the issue has found that black insti-
tutions do not have a cognizable argument for retaining their identity as
black institutions. The courts have viewed it as equally invidious for a
black institution to discriminate against whites as for white colleges to
discriminate against blacks. The policy of eliminating subordination has
not been accepted as a justification for differentiation on the basis of race.
This approach has needlessly curtailed the means available to overcome a
history of racial subordination. If that history inspired the development
The defendant did not gain from the argument that black institutions play a special role for the
black community, and thus should be specially protected.
224 Planells v. Howard Univ., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 336, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 34,089 (D.D.C. 1983).
225 Id. at 345 n.1, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) % 34,089, at 32, 135 n.1 (citations omitted).
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of the strict scrutiny test in the first instance, then that history should
also lead courts to permit measures that can help overcome subordina-
tion. It is irrational to create a test designed to eliminate the effect of this
history of subordination and then implement the test in such a narrow
fashion that it impedes the achievement of that goal. The framework
proposed by this Article226 would create greater flexibility without hav-
ing an overall detrimental effect on the level of scrutiny.
2. Women's Colleges
Courts have been far more sympathetic to the argument that an all-
women's college may constitutionally serve a substantial state interest.227
The recognized state interests have included not only anti-subordination
but a variety of other goals. Because women's colleges have historically
employed both male and female faculty, 228 the context in which these
cases have arisen is admissions rather than hiring. The underlying issues,
however, have been very similar to those in race cases; yet, the outcomes
have been quite different.
The courts have repeatedly accepted the concept of "separate but
equal" in the sex discrimination context. For example, in Vorchheimer v.
School District of Philadelphia,229 a challenge to single-sex schools in the
226 See text accompanying notes 252-56 infra.
227 The first word from the Supreme Court on this issue came in the Court's summary
affirmance of Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 951
(1971). The Court affirmed Williams on March 8, 1971, see 401 U.S. at 951, just one week
after probable jurisdiction was noted in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S.
934 (1971). Hence, the Court had decided to hear Reed but had not yet begun to develop a
heightened standard of review in sex-based equal protection cases.
The Williams Court summarily affirmed a three-judge district court's holding that a sin-
gle-sex admissions policy in an all-female state college was constitutional. 401 U.S. at 951.
Although the Court does not provide its reasoning in a summary affirmance, it is fair to as-
sume, based on the reasoning of the lower court, that the case stands for separate but equal
doctrine in the single-sex education context. The lower court had observed that the all-female
school needed to be examined in the context of the range of educational institutions available.
316 F. Supp. at 137. Because there was only one all-female school and only one all-male
school, and many coeducational institutions available, the lower court had found that no sub-
stantial unequal treatment existed. Id. A second crucial factor influencing the court's decision
was a stipulation by the parties that "there is a respectable body of educators who believe that
'a single-sex institution can advance the quality and effectiveness of its institution by concen-
trating upon areas of primary interest to only one sex.'" Id.
In 1976, the Third Circuit followed Williams in Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d
880, 887 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd mem., 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
In the statutory context, Congress has also approved single-sex education. Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1), (5) (1982) (exception for undergraduate
single-sex education).
228 See generally H. Horowitz, Alma Mater: Design and Experience in the Women's Col-
leges from Their Nineteenth-Century Beginnings to the 1930s, at 4, 179-82 (1984) (discussing
history of all-women's colleges).
229 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), aff'd mem., 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
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Philadelphia school district, the Third Circuit confronted the argument
that precedents from race discrimination cases prohibited sex-segregated
education. 230 The court, however, rejected that analogy.
We are committed to the concept that there is no fundamental differ-
ence between races and therefore, in justice, there can be no dissimilar
treatment. But there are differences between the sexes which may, in
limited circumstances, justify disparity in law. As the Supreme Court
has said, "[g]ender has never been rejected as an impermissible classifi-
cation in all instances.
231
Implicit in the court's discussion of the race cases was the assump-
tion that strict scrutiny would not permit a dual school system. The
availability of rational basis or intermediate scrutiny in the sex context
was used to distinguish the race cases. Yet, the argument accepted under
lowered scrutiny was not an argument for anti-subordination. No special
concern for providing girls with educational opportunities that they were
previously unable to obtain was evident. It appeared that the court ac-
cepted the unsubstantiated premise that boys and girls equally benefit
from single-sex education because they study more effectively in a single-
sex environment.232 Although there may be versions of this argument
with anti-subordination nuances, namely, that girls should have the op-
tion of studying and developing leadership skills in an environment free
of the sexism of male teachers and students,233 there was no evidence that
such opportunities were available in this case. The conclusory analysis
used by the Vorchheimer court is dangerous because it can perpetuate
subordination through the reinforcement of stereotypical views.
The Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Mississippi University for
230 See id. at 886.
231 Id. (quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 n.10 (1974)). The court then found that
the school district had met its burden of justification under both the rational basis test and the
intermediate scrutiny test. Id. at 888. It found that the record contained sufficient evidence to
establish that a legitimate educational policy may be served by utilizing single-sex high
schools. "Thus, given the objective of a quality education and a controverted, but respected
theory that adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex schools, the policy of the
school board here does bear a substantial relationship." Id. The court overlooked available
evidence that the boys' high school (called Central High School) was much better than the
girls' high schoool (called Girls High). See Bums, Apologia for the Status Quo (Book Re-
view), 74 Geo. L.J. 1791, 1801-02 (1986).
232 See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 888.
233 For an excellent discussion of such benefits, see Feldblum, Krent & Watkin, Legal Chal-
lenges to All-Female Organizations, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 171 (1986). Although these
authors have superbly canvassed the anti-subordination arguments for distinguishing all-fe-
male organizations from all-male organizations, they rest their analysis upon the special pro-
tection line of cases without recognizing the danger of such reliance. They seem to assume
that the only permissible justification under the special protection case law is anti-subordina-
tion. As this Article has demonstrated, that is a false premise. See text accompanying notes
158-82 supra.
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Women v. Hogan 234 clarified the bounds of the Vorchheimer court's ap-
proach. In Hogan the Court was faced with the question of whether a
state could constitutionally maintain a nursing program in which course
credit was only available to women.235 The majority held that it could
not,236 but suggested that its answer might have been different with re-
spect to other programs. The majority noted in a footnote that its deci-
sion did not resolve whether the admissions policy, as applied to men
seeking admissions to schools other than the school of nursing, violated
the fourteenth amendment.237 In contrast to the strong language in
Brown v. Board of Education,238 the Court did not find that separate is
always unequal or invidious. Thus, even though the single-sex policy
was struck down in Hogan, the principle of anti-differentiation was not
accorded nearly as much weight as it had been accorded in race cases.
The four dissenting Justices in Hogan argued more overtly that
"separate but equal" is still a valid claim in sex discrimination cases.239
From their arguments, coupled with the majority's footnote, one can
then infer that the Court might uphold a public all-female business
school that was founded with the purpose of enhancing opportunities for
234 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
235 See id. at 721.
236 Id. at 731.
237 Id. at 723 n.7.
238 347 U.S. 483 (1954). According to the Court in Brown: "We conclude that in the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal." Id. at 495.
239 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that the majority's decision did not
question that the "[s]tate might well be justified in maintaining, for example, the option of an
all-women's business school or liberal arts program." 458 U.S. at 733 (Burger, C.3., dissent-
ing). Justice Blackmun dissented and made the following plea for flexibility in the sex discrim-
ination context:
I have come to suspect that it is easy to go too far with rigid rules in this area of claimed
sex discrimination, and to lose-indeed destroy-values that mean much to some people
by forbidding the State to offer them a choice while not depriving others of an alterna-
tive choice.
Id. at 734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In other words, Justice Blackmun argued that intermediate scrutiny, as applied by the
majority, did not accord sufficient weight to the special sex role values that many elements of
our society wish to maintain. Single-sex education has historically been one of those values,
according to Blackmun.
Finally, Justices Powell and Rehnquist argued strongly that single-sex education is a valid
tradition that should not be lost. For example, Justice Powell favorably quoted the arguments
made by students and alumnae of Mississippi University for Women (MUW), as amici, in
favor of single-sex education.
[MUW] can serve to overcome the historic repression of the past and can orient women
to function and achieve in the still male dominated economy. It can free its students of
the burden of playing the mating game while attending classes, thus giving academic
rather than sexual emphasis.
Id. at 739 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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women. Anti-subordination might, in the proper case, justify
differentiation.
By contrast, Howard University Law School would have little suc-
cess arguing that it should be able to limit itself exclusively or primarily
to blacks because blacks have historically been given few opportunities to
study law and would benefit from the opportunity to work together in
greater numbers. 24° The source of the difference between these hypothet-
ical results is found in the level of scrutiny and in the Court's considera-
tion of sex-related anti-subordination arguments. 241
The Hogan Court recognized that "a gender-based classification
favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists
members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened. '242 The Court,
however, did not view this analysis as independent of intermediate scru-
tiny;243 it saw such justification as an intrinsic aspect of that level of scru-
tiny, equivalent in importance to many other justifications that have been
offered in the sex discrimination context. The Court examined the pur-
ported anti-subordination rationale under intermediate scrutiny, but re-
jected it because it was supported by neither empirical evidence nor the
actual policies of the state.
244
The important question is not whether the defendant university was
correct in extolling the benefits of single-sex education. Rather, the cru-
cial issue was: At what cost to sex discrimination jurisprudence were
certain members of the Court willing to consider such arguments? What
other "values" would the dissenters, such as Justice Blackmun,245 care to
promote in the sex role context, other than single-sex education?
We do know what some of those other values are, and we have seen
the retrogressive results of their consideration. The value of avoiding
sending women into combat has permitted the complete exclusion of
women from draft registration and induction into the armed services.
246
The value of recognizing women's special reproductive role has permit-
240 Cf. Planells v. Howard Univ., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 336, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 34,089 (D.D.C. 1983).
Given Howard University Law School's impact on the development of the civil rights
movement's legal strategy, see R. Kluger, supra note 60, at 126-32, it is ironic that Howard
University Law School can not take affirmative steps to maintain its character as a black insti-
tution serving as a beacon for the civil rights community.
241 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723-26.
242 Id. at 728.
243 The majority characterized its level of scrutiny as intermediate, id. at 723-25 & 724 n.9,
and then explored the state's argument that the single-sex policy compensated for discrimina-
tion against women and, therefore, constituted educational affirmative action, id. at 727.
244 Id. at 728-31.
245 See note 239 supra.
246 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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ted men, but not women, to be convicted for statutory rape. 24 7 The value
of providing veterans with lifetime public employment benefits has justi-
fied veterans preference statutes that greatly limit women's employment
opportunities. 248 This Article therefore argues that while equal protec-
tion analysis should permit consideration of the anti-subordination val-
ues inherent in, for example, some single-sex education programs, it
should not do so in a framework of lowered scrutiny that permits consid-
eration of other, invidious values.
IV
BRINGING THE PRINCIPLE OF ANTI-SUBORDINATION TO
THE FOREFRONT
Race- and sex-based equal protection doctrine emerged from a con-
cern for the subordination of blacks and women. Nevertheless, the equal
protection framework that has evolved does not allow that concern to
have its fullest expression. At the stage of the prima facie case, the anti-
differentiation principle currently dominates the constitutional analysis.
That principle creates the presumption that all race- and sex-specific poli-
cies are discriminatory, and that no race- and sex-neutral policies are
discriminatory unless accompanied by race- or sex-specific motivation. 249
The anti-differentiation principle also dominates the statutory analysis,
with the presumption that all race- and sex-specific policies are discrimi-
natory; however, the statutory analysis more flexibly recognizes that
race- and sex-neutral policies can have a discriminatory effect, even
where proof of discriminatory motivation is lacking.250 At the stage of
justification, the anti-differentiation principle has dominated review of
the discrimination claims that the courts have taken most seriously-
race cases. In sex discrimination cases, courts have been more willing to
deviate from the principle of anti-differentiation, sometimes to consider
arguments less laudatory than anti-subordination.
These theoretical inconsistencies have created numerous practical
difficulties. Race- or sex-specific policies are often necessary to overcome
structural inequalities within an institution, yet such policies are ren-
dered presumptively invalid at the prima facie case stage. Only sex-spe-
cific policies survive an equal protection challenge through an awkward
and dangerous use of intermediate scrutiny at the justification stage;251
247 See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
248 See Personnel Adm'rs of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding state policy of
hiring and promoting veterans over non-veterans, after finding preferential classification not to
be pretext for sex discrimination).
249 See text accompanying notes 54-55, 72-75 supra.
250 See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
251 See text accompanying notes 151-82 supra.
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race-specific policies have almost no chance of survival under strict scru-
tiny.252 Given these difficulties with the existing framework, I propose
modification of the existing approach in two respects.
The first modification eliminates the presumptive invalidity of race-
or sex-specific policies at the prima facie case stage. Under the proposed
framework, such a policy would not be presumed invalid unless it pro-
duces a negative disparate impact on a particular racial or ethnic group,
or on a single sex. Under this framework, a race- or sex-specific rule
could be viewed as a positive step towards eliminating race- or sex-based
inequalities, as redressing subordination rather than creating
differentiation.
The second modification more directly incorporates the anti-subor-
dination approach into the stage of justification. As the discussion in
Part III demonstrates, the limited successes of anti-subordination advo-
cates have come at the expense of the overall level of scrutiny. Rather
than criticize the lowered level of scrutiny, anti-subordination advocates
have tried to tailor their arguments to nebulous standards, like "compel-
ling interests," that courts have used in effectuating the intermediate
level of scrutiny. But the adverse effects that accompany lowered scru-
tiny need not be tolerated. A strict level of scrutiny can be preserved if it
is recognized that the only justification for race- or sex-specific policies is
the redress of a prior experience or history of subordination. This anti-
subordination version of the equal protection model can bring the discus-
sion of subordination to the forefront of the equal protection analysis.
The proposed framework has two key advantages. First, it would
allow institutions to implement and defend remedial race- and sex-spe-
cific policies and actions without having to rely on stereotypes about mi-
norities or women. A defendant would be able, at the justification stage,
to show that its policy would help eliminate subordination. Second, the
framework would ensconce the normative values of anti-subordination
within the entire equal protection analysis and thereby make that analy-
sis more meaningful. Under the existing equal protection model, the
courts have yet to resolve fully whether they prefer the principle of anti-
differentiation to that of anti-subordination. This framework would pro-
vide the analytic process of equal protection with a consistent theoretical
base.
A. Making the Most of the Disparate Impact Method of Proof
The disparate impact model has been a powerful tool in the hands of
plaintiffs challenging facially neutral rules that have discriminatory ef-
252 See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
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fects, although its use has thus far been too limited.253 To make it more
effective, the concept of disparate impact should be expanded to include
socially created impact. In addition, this model should be available to
defendants to justify facially differentiating rules that help eradicate sub-
ordination. Instead of creating a presumption that a rule is invidious
when it is phrased in race- or sex-specific terms, courts should consider
the impact of the rule. Just as race- or sex-neutral policies or actions
may have either invidious or benign effects, race- or sex-specific policies
or actions may also have either invidious or positive effects. Accord-
ingly, courts should always look to the effect of a rule, even when the
language is race- or sex-specific. Thus, both facially differentiating and
facially neutral rules, when they cause disparate impact on the basis of
race or sex, would have to be justified with heightened scrutiny.
This modification does not require that facial differentiation be
wholly irrelevant. We have seen historically that facial differentiation
can be extremely powerful in perpetuating subordination. However, it
can also have a very powerful impact on redressing subordination. It is,
difficult to imagine racial or sexual differentiation in rulemaking not hav-
ing any impact one way or another on subordination.254 The important
point is that we should not assume that differentiation always abets sub-
ordination. We should allow the courts to consider more fully the possi-
bility that differentiation, on the contrary, often redresses subordination.
Accordingly, under the proposed framework, plaintiffs would con-
tinue to present evidence of differentiation at the prima facie case stage.
However, they would be required to supplement that evidence with an
explanation of how that differentiation contributes to their subordina-
tion. The trial court would make a specific finding as to whether the
differentiation contributed to, or redressed, subordination. It would
rarely have the option of finding that the differentiation had no effect on
subordination, because differentiation is too powerful a tool not to have
any effect in the vast majority of situations.
The implications of this proposed framework can be seen in its ap-
plication to the earlier hypothetical about a leave policy that has a dispa-
rate impact on black women.255 Let us assume that the employer decides
to implement a new four-week leave policy for nonprofessional black fe-
male workers who have primary childcare responsibilities that are exac-
253 See text accompanying notes 123-25 supra.
254 Although some might suggest that certain differentiating rules, such as separate public
restrooms and clothing regulations, have a de minimus or trivial effect on subordination, I
disagree. For criticisms of the view that such regulations are trivial, see Wasserstom, supra
note 49, at 592-94; Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5
Harv. Women's L.. 73, 118 (1982).
255 See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
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erbated by extenuating circumstances, such as difficult bus schedules or
unavailability of day care resources. The employer wishes to redress the
disparate impact of the previous leave policy, and chooses this leave pol-
icy rather than a race- or sex-neutral leave policy because it does not feel
a responsibility to subsidize the child care needs of all of its employees.
Rather, it only wants to subsidize those needs when they have a negative
impact on employment opportunities. In the employer's experience, that
problem only exists for black nonprofessional female workers.
Under the current equal protection model, white male, black male,
and white female nonprofessionals would be able to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination because of the explicit differentiation embod-
ied in the policy. By contrast, under the proposed framework, these
plaintiffs would have an additional hurdle-they would also have to al-
lege disparate impact. The issue then would become how to measure
disparate impact. Are the white men, who receive only two weeks of
leave time, suffering from a loss of employment opportunities by virtue of
this new policy? Is the difference in leave time, alone, sufficient to estab-
lish disparate impact or should a more tangible loss of employment op-
portunities be required? This Article argues that these questions must be
answered from an anti-subordination perspective. Thus, although white
male employees might be able to show "disparate impact" from a literal
point of view, in that they receive less leave time, they would probably be
unable to show on these facts that it rose to the level of a subordinating
disparate impact. By contrast, it is conceivable that nonprofessional
white women might be able to make out a colorable claim of disparate
impact with evidence of a more substantial loss of employment opportu-
nities. The purpose of the proposed framework is to make a discussion of
anti-subordination occur, not to provide an easy answer as to how it
should be resolved.
B. Restricting the Means of Justification
If the plaintiffs challenging the new leave policy establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, through disparate impact, then the case
would proceed to the stage of justification. Under the existing equal pro-
tection framework, such a policy could not be justified without lowering
the level of scrutiny to an intermediate level of scrutiny.256 Under the
proposed framework, a strict level of scrutiny is maintained, and this
policy could be justified only if it was established to overcome subordina-
tion. Was the employer acting on the basis of traditional stereotypes? Or
was the employer acting consciously to eliminate subordination? How
do the black women within the workplace view the policy? Do they be-
256 See text accompanying notes 131-40 supra.
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lieve that it is helping to establish equality within the workplace? Again,
this is a factual inquiry that this Article cannot resolve in the abstract.
Even if the court found the policy unjustified, the proposed framework
would have the crucial effect of basing the discussion on a normative
principle of anti-subordination.
This new framework would essentially relabel "affirmative action"
as "anti-subordination." In assessing measures that purport to be "af-
firmative action," the courts would focus on the actual effects of a policy
within a social and historical context. Moreover, consideration of the
principle of anti-subordination would not weaken the overall level of
scrutiny; instead, allowing the justification of anti-subordination would
infuse meaningful content into the concept of strict scrutiny. Rather
than being "fatal in fact," strict scrutiny would be able to uphold facially
differentiating policies or actions that serve to redress subordination.
C Rewriting the Race Cases
Under the proposed framework, the University of California could
have defended the Davis admissions program in two ways that were un-
available at the time of Bakke. First, it could have rebutted Allan
Bakke's prima facie case by showing that its race-conscious admissions
program did not have a subordinating disparate impact on the basis of
race. It could have produced evidence of the educational opportunities
in medicine that are available in the California area to minorities and to
whites. Specifically, it could have introduced evidence of past and pres-
ent racial discrimination in the California public school system, 257 the
history of the Davis medical school's exclusion of racial minorities, 258
and the unreliability of the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) as
an indicator of minority performance in medical school.259 In this light,
the Davis program created equal opportunity where none had previously
existed.
If Allan Bakke had been able to show a disparate impact on white
applicants, the university would have had a second opportunity to defend
its policy at the justification stage with similar evidence of the historical
lack of opportunities that blacks have had in the medical profession, as
well as with a showing that an increase in the number of black doctors in
257 Professor Bell argues that had minority groups been represented directly in the Bakke
case, they would have introduced evidence from previous decisions finding racial discrimina-
tion in the California schools. Bell, Bakke, supra note 5, at 6 & n.9.
258 When the school opened in 1968, no blacks or Chicanos were admitted, and only two
blacks and Chicanos were admitted in 1969. Bell, Bakke, supra note 5, at 6.
259 According to the Association of American Medical Colleges, blacks can succeed in med-
ical school with a lower MCAT than whites, where success is defined as uninterrupted pro-
gress through the first two years of medical school. See Bell, Bakke, supra note 5, at 7 n. 11.
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the community could help reduce subordination. The difference between
the analyses at the prima facie and justification stages is that the court
would focus on the effects of the policy on the plaintiff's class (whites) at
the first stage and on its effects on the subordinated group (blacks) at the
second stage. Thus, even if the case got to the justification stage, one
would expect the policy to withstand scrutiny under the proposed
framework.
This proposed framework could also support a predominantly black
institution. A court would respect the decision of an institution to be
predominantly black if the institution could show that its composition
helped to redress a history of racial discrimination. At the stage of justi-
fication, Howard University Law School would be able to argue that it
wanted to prefer blacks in hiring or admissions in order to serve the black
community more effectively. Although it is difficult to state with confi-
dence whether the black community is best served by a predominantly
black institution, it is important to have an equal protection framework
that can uphold this choice, so long as it is firmly connected to the princi-
ple of anti-subordination.
D. Rewriting the Sex Cases
As one of the central goals of this Article is to develop an analytic
framework in which cases of sex discrimination are taken more seriously,
this next section focuses on two previously discussed cases that have ap-
plied the existing intermediate scrutiny approach, Michael M, v. Superior
Court 260 and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.261 The purpose
of this discussion is not to show that the proposed framework would
automatically have obtained a different result in each case, but rather to
show that the limitations of the prevailing framework of intermediate
scrutiny prevented the Court from even beginning to ask the questions
that are essential to an equal protection analysis from an anti-subordina-
tion perspective.
The Michael M. case would look very different under an anti-subor-
dination analysis. First, the Court would inquire whether the application
of the statutory rape provision had a disparate impact on the basis of sex.
Justice Rehnquist assumed that the state statute produced such a dispa-
rate impact because he assumed that the state would prosecute males
who had sexual relations with underage females262 but not females who
had sexual relations with underage males. His assumption is based on
260 450 U.S. 464 (1981); see text accompanying notes 172-82 supra.
261 458 U.S. 718 (1982); see text accompanying notes 234-45 supra.
262 See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 466 ("The statute thus makes men alone criminally liable
for the act of sexual intercourse.").
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heterosexual stereotyping, which may in fact reflect reality, but there is
no way to know from the record available in Michael M. Nevertheless,
the prosecution of only one of the two actors involved in the sexual act
could support a conclusion of disparate impact.
263
If the plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination, then
the inquiry would move to the justification stage. The sole justificatory
question would be: Does this statute further or remedy the subordination
of women? To answer this question, one would have to listen to voices of
underage females. Their voices, however, were conspicuously absent
from this case, and it was therefore difficult to know their views on the
effect of this statute. Under an anti-subordination perspective it would
be essential to have at least the underage female, Sharon, for whose pro-
tection the statute supposedly exists, be an active party in the prosecu-
tion.264  If application of the statute would further women's
subordination, then we could hope that the individual woman would not
agree to the prosecution. However, under the California statutory rape
law the state did not have to seek Sharon's permission to prosecute. The
Court should therefore have remanded this case with instructions to in-
quire: Did she welcome the prosecution? Or did this prosecution repre-
sent yet one more way in which she was not given control over her life
and liberty? Did this entire prosecution and lawsuit empower Sharon or
rob her of control?
A revised perspective on the statute, one that focuses on subordina-
tion, would eventually force the use of the statute for what women really
want, which is prevention and punishment of coercive sexual encounters.
Sharon's cries of coercion would recieve dominant consideration rather
than be hidden in a footnote.
265
Justice Rehnquist purported to consider women's interests when he
discussed whether women face disabilities from their ability to become
pregnant. But his discussion of women's interests was very removed
from reality. The real issue in Michael M. was the lawfulness of particu-
263 But again, one would have to show that this impact occurred on the basis of sex. It is
only on the basis of sex if one assumes that the two participants in the sexual act are of the
opposite sex. For a critique of statutory rape laws from an anti-differentiation perspective, see
Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 2, at 185-88.
264 For further discussion of this idea, see Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of
Rights Analysis, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 387, 407-09 (1984).
265 There was strong evidence of coercion in this case. Justice Blackmun quoted an ex-
change from the hearing, in which Sharon testified that she kissed Michael, but then told him
to stop, and said she did not want to take her pants off; she testified that she eventually submit-
ted after he slugged her in the face. Michael M, 450 U.S. at 484-85 n.*. Justice Blackmun
cited the testimony for the proposition that Sharon appeared "not to have been an unwilling
participant in at least the initial stages of the intimacies that took place." Id. at 483. A prose-
cution with her consent might have helped Sharon gain the control over her sexuality that
Justice Blackmun seems to have assumed she had.
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lar sexual behavior. An examination into the history of statutory rape
laws shows that they were viewed as a means to control male sexual ag-
gression and to attack the double standard of sexual morality.266 In as-
sessing the constitutionality of such laws, the Court should have inquired
whether individuals should be prosecuted for engaging in sexual acts
with an underage female. To answer that question, the Court would
have to know about the coercive and oppressive nature of the sexual be-
havior in question. Do underage girls, generally, need to be protected
from aggressive sexual behavior? Did Sharon? That is the most immedi-
ate question.
Turning to a reassessment of Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan,267 one would first ask whether the male plaintiff had as many
opportunities to study nursing as the average woman, that is, whether the
single-sex admission policy had a disparate impact on men. Admittedly,
this would be a difficult question to resolve. For example, one might
consider how many men and women applied to the nursing programs in
all of the state's universities and how many of each sex were admitted. If
the additional spaces available for women, by virtue of the MUW policy,
only reflected a higher interest in nursing among women, then a court
might not find a prima facie case of discrimination under the proposed
framework. Unfortunately, the answer might not be that simple because
of the invidious factors that undoubtedly influence applicant flow. Since
men are unlikely to apply for a program that advertises "for women
only," the facially differentiating admissions policy may skew the dispa-
rate impact analysis. Nevertheless, under the new framework, the fact
that the university used sex-specific language would not be determinative
of the prima facie discrimination issue.268 Some considerations of the
effect of the policy would have to be made.
If it were determined that the policy in Hogan did produce disparate
impact, then the case would proceed to analysis on the critical issue-the
policy's contribution both to a history of inequality and to the existing
circumstances of inequality. This analysis would produce a rich discus-
sion of the important role that single-sex or predominantly female insti-
266 For an excellent discussion of this history, see Olsen, supra note 264, at 402-04.
267 458 U.S. 718 (1982); see text accompanying notes 234-45 supra.
268 However, one would have to inquire whether the sex-specific rule violated any other
constitutional requirement. For example, many southern school systems created sex-segre-
gated education after court-ordered racial desegregation was imposed. See Note, The Consti-
tutionality of Sex Separation in School Desegregation Plans, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 296, 297 &
n.14 (1970) (citing 12 cases in which sex segregation followed court-ordered racial desegrega-
tion). These school systems did not want black boys and white girls to be educated together.
Id. at 300-01. If the purpose of this policy was to undermine racial desegregation, there would
be a prima fade case of discrimination, but with regard to race rather than sex.
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tutions may serve in eliminating the subordination of women.269 Rather
than focus on sexual stereotyping, as did the Vorchheimer court in up-
holding single-sex education for both boys and girls,2 70 the inquiry would
turn to subordination. For example, the court would probe whether the
availability of female bonding in an all-female or predominantly female
school facilitated women's emancipation. The answer would depend
upon the nature of the institution. A very traditional school that empha-
sized teaching women housekeeping skills and etiquette, or even nursing,
might not serve the purpose of anti-subordination, but a highly
politicized all-women's school might. The court should ask: Does the
institution reinforce traditional views of women or does it provide
women with the skills and tools to fight their subordination?
CONCLUSION: THE REMAINING DIFFICULTIES
One might argue that this Article's proposed framework raises more
difficulties than it resolves. How does one define disparate impact? Can
the analysis be applied to classifications other than race or sex? How
subordinated must one's group be to trigger this analysis? At what point
is the subordination of a group sufficiently redressed, so that it can no
longer claim entitlement to differentiating policies designed to redress its
prior history of subordination? What policies redress subordination?
Are there truly no principles other than anti-subordination that should
justify race- or sex-specific policies or actions?
These are hard questions that cannot be addressed theoretically. If
we are committed to the principle of anti-subordination, then we should
be equally committed to finding the answers to these questions in specific
factual settings. In this Article, I have not tried to resolve all of these
questions; instead, I have set forth a principle and framework under
which we can begin to answer these questions. Recently, the courts have
begun to explore the importance of the anti-subordination principle in
resolving affirmative action disputes, but have not yet tried to incorporate
this principle more fully within all of equal protection doctrine. I have
therefore tried to show the power of the anti-subordination principle as a
tool in assessing all claims of inequality, not simply claims of reverse
discrimination. Consistent application of the anti-subordination princi-
ple would be an important step in our journey towards equality.
269 See Feldblum, Krent & Watkin, supra note 233.
270 See text accompanying notes 229-33 supra.
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